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The Labor Market in the 
Great Recession
ABSTRACT From the perspective of a wide range of labor market out-
comes, the recession that began in 2007 represents the deepest downturn in 
the postwar era. Early on, the nature of labor market adjustment displayed a
notable resemblance to that observed in past severe downturns. During the lat-
ter half of 2009, however, the path of adjustment exhibited important depar-
tures from that seen during and after prior deep recessions. Recent data point
to two warning signs going forward. First, the record rise in long-term un-
employment may yield a persistent residue of long-term unemployed workers
with weak search effectiveness. Second, conventional estimates suggest that
the extension of Emergency Unemployment Compensation may have led to a
modest increase in unemployment. Despite these forces, we conclude that the
problems facing the U.S. labor market are unlikely to be as severe as the Euro-
pean unemployment problem of the 1980s.
Since December 2007, labor market conditions in the United Stateshave deteriorated dramatically. The depth and duration of the decline
in economic activity have led many to refer to the downturn as the “Great
Recession.” In this paper we document the adjustment of the labor market
during the recession and place it in the broader context of previous postwar
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downturns. What emerges is a picture of labor market dynamics with three
key recurring themes:
—From the perspective of a wide range of labor market outcomes, the
recession that began in 2007 (hereafter “the 2007 recession”)1 represents the
deepest downturn in the postwar era.
—Early on, the nature of labor market adjustment in the 2007 recession
displayed a notable resemblance to that observed in past severe downturns.
—During the latter half of 2009, however, the path of adjustment
exhibited important departures from that seen during and after prior deep
recessions.
These broad conclusions arise from a detailed investigation of the
behavior of labor market stocks and flows over the course of the downturn.2
Our point of departure, in section I, is to document patterns over time in key
labor market indicators—unemployment, employment, labor force partici-
pation, and hours per worker—during the 2007 recession. No matter what
indicator of labor market activity we consider, the deterioration of labor
market conditions during this recession is the worst on record since the late
1940s. Rates of unemployment among most major subgroups of the labor
market reached postwar highs. From the perspective of the labor market,
the 2007 recession is truly a Great Recession.
As noted above, we nonetheless observe that many dimensions of these
key indicators mirror those seen in past recessions. Labor force participa-
tion declined, reflecting the modest procyclicality observed in many post-
war recessions; the relative contributions of the intensive and the extensive
margins (that is, of changes in hours per worker and in the number of
workers employed) to the decline in total labor input typify the conven-
tional one-third hours to two-thirds bodies split observed in the past; and
the constellation of demographic groups most affected—younger workers,
male workers, less educated workers, and workers from ethnic minorities—
is reminiscent of previous downturns.
2 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Spring 2010
1. We adopt this terminology because although the recession is widely believed to have
ended in 2009, as of this writing the Business Cycle Dating Committee of the National
Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) has not yet fixed an end date. In some of our figures,
specification of an end date is unavoidable and is not intended as a firm judgment as to when
the recession ended.
2. A drawback of the real-time nature of our analysis is that a detailed treatment of the
cyclical behavior of wages is infeasible. Although timely aggregate compensation data are
available, such data are plagued by countercyclical composition biases, as low-skilled work-
ers are more likely to lose their jobs in time of recession. As emphasized by Solon, Barsky,
and Parker (1994), obtaining an accurate sense of real-wage cyclicality requires the use of
longitudinal microdata that are available in a less timely manner.
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It is well known that changes in aggregate unemployment in the United
States mask substantial variation in underlying worker flows, a point
emphasized by Olivier Blanchard and Peter Diamond (1990). Reflecting
this fact, in section II we investigate the sources of increased unemploy-
ment in the 2007 recession by analyzing the behavior of unemployment
flows. This analysis reveals that both increased inflows into unemploy-
ment and declines in the rate at which workers flow out of the unemploy-
ment pool play crucial roles in accounting for the recent upswing in
unemployment. As in previous severe recessions, the initial ramp-up in
unemployment was accompanied by a sharp rise in inflows. In contrast to
the claims of some recent literature on unemployment flows (Hall 2005,
Shimer 2007), elevated rates of inflow in time of recession appear not to be
a relic of past downturns, but rather a distinctive feature of severe reces-
sions, both old and modern. The behavior of the outflow rate also mirrors
that observed in past deep recessions: as the wave of inflows receded in the
latter stages of the 2007 recession, the outflow rate continued to fall. Reflect-
ing the distinctive severity of the downturn, recent data have seen the outflow
rate reach a postwar low.
Measures of unemployment flows for different labor force groups yield
an important message on the sources of the disparate trends in unemploy-
ment across those groups: higher levels and greater cyclical sensitivity of
joblessness among young, low-skilled, and minority workers, both in this
and in previous downturns, are driven predominantly by differences in
rates of entry into unemployment between these groups and others. In
sharp contrast, a striking feature of unemployment exit rates is a remark-
able uniformity in their cyclical behavior across labor force groups—the
declines in outflow rates during this and prior recessions are truly an aggre-
gate phenomenon.
In the remainder of section II, we take advantage of a unique opportu-
nity to assess the role of labor turnover in the 2007 recession. This is the
first full upswing in unemployment covered by the new Job Openings
and Labor Turnover Survey (JOLTS), which reveals some stark find-
ings. In contrast to the behavior of unemployment inflows, rates of sep-
aration of workers from employers did not rise in the 2007 recession.
This suggests support for a hypothesis offered by Robert Hall (2005):
increases in unemployment inflows may have little to do with increased
rates of job loss, but merely are a symptom of declining rates of job find-
ing among potential job-to-job movers. Our analysis of the JOLTS data
points to a different story: increased inflows into unemployment are driven
predominantly by a change in the composition of separations toward 
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layoffs, which are likely to result in unemployment, and away from
quits, which often represent workers flowing to new jobs upon separa-
tion. Job loss played a key role in driving increased unemployment in
the 2007 recession.
We close our analysis in section III by assessing the outlook for the
recovery of the labor market in the wake of the current downturn. Moti-
vated by the recent subsidence of inflows into unemployment and the his-
toric decline in the outflow rate from unemployment, we emphasize the
importance of a rebound in the latter for future reductions in unemploy-
ment and highlight a potential cause for concern in recent data. The post-
war U.S. labor market has been characterized by two remarkably stable
aggregate relationships: the inverse co-movement of unemployment and
vacancies—the Beveridge curve—and the positive association between
the outflow rate from unemployment and the vacancy-unemployment
ratio, a point noted by Robert Shimer (2005). The latter half of 2009 wit-
nessed a break from these relationships, with unemployment rising higher
than implied by the historical Beveridge curve, and the outflow rate from
unemployment falling significantly below the path implied by the past rela-
tionship with the vacancy-unemployment ratio.
These trends resemble those observed in the breakdown in efficiency
of matching jobs with workers that accompanied the European un-
employment problem of the 1980s, raising the concern of persistent
unemployment, or hysteresis, in U.S. unemployment going forward. We
consider a range of possible causes of hysteresis, including sectoral mis-
match, the extension of the duration of unemployment insurance bene-
fits, the dependence of unemployment outflow rates on the duration 
of unemployment, and reductions in the rates of worker flows—what
Blanchard (2000) has termed “sclerosis.” Recent data point to two warn-
ing signs. First, the historic decline in unemployment outflow rates has
been accompanied by a record rise in long-term unemployment. We
show that this is likely to result in a persistent residue of long-term
unemployed workers with relatively weak search effectiveness, depress-
ing the strength of the recovery. Second, conventional estimates of the
impact of longer unemployment benefit duration on the length of unem-
ployment spells suggest that the extension of Emergency Unemploy-
ment Compensation starting in June 2008 is likely to have led to a modest
increase in long-term unemployment. Nonetheless, we conclude that,
despite these adverse forces, they have not yet reached a magnitude that
would augur a European-style hysteresis problem in the U.S. economy
in the long run.
4 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Spring 2010
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I. Basic Facts about the Labor Market in the 2007 Recession
The recession that started in December 2007 has been severe according to
many measures, not least in terms of its effect on the labor market. In this
section we review the recent behavior of some of the main aggregate mea-
sures of labor market outcomes and place the recent deterioration in labor
market conditions in the broader historical context of previous postwar
recessions.
I.A. Unemployment, Employment, Labor Force Participation, 
and Hours per Worker
The main labor market indicator on which much of this paper will focus
is the unemployment rate. To set the stage, figure 1 displays the published
time series for the civilian unemployment rate from Current Population
Survey (CPS) data. The 2007 recession figures prominently in this series.
Unemployment rose from a prerecession low of 4.4 percent to reach 10.1
percent in October 2009. This increase—5.7 percentage points—is the
largest postwar upswing in the unemployment rate. It dwarfs the rise in job-
lessness in the two previous recessions, in 1990–91 and 2001, when in each
case unemployment rose by approximately 2.5 percentage points. It domi-
nates even the severe recession of 1973–75 (4.4 percentage points) as well
as the combined effects of the consecutive recessions of the early 1980s
(5.2 percentage points). There is little doubt that the present downturn is
the deepest since World War II from the perspective of the labor market.3
In what follows we will closely examine the rise in unemployment in
the present downturn. But it is helpful at this point to place the increase in
joblessness in the broader context of other, related labor market indicators.
We consider two sets of measures: first, the relationship between the rise in
unemployment and the decline in employment during the downturn, and
second, the role of the decline in employment relative to the decline in
hours per worker in accounting for the contraction in total labor input.
THE DECLINE IN EMPLOYMENT. The unemployment rate at a given point 
in time ut can be related to the level of employment Et and the size of the
labor force Lt by the simple identity ut = 1 − (Et /Lt). This identity suggests a
simple metric for gauging the relative roles of variation in employment
MICHAEL W. L. ELSBY, BART HOBIJN, and AYS¸EGÜL S¸AHI·N 5
3. Of course, even the current ramp-up in the unemployment rate is overshadowed by
that witnessed during the Great Depression. In 1929 the unemployment rate stood at 3.2 per-
cent, rising to 25.2 percent by 1933, a 22-percentage-point rise in 4 years. Indeed, such is the
extremity of the Great Depression that adding it to any plot renders the postwar variation in
joblessness very difficult to perceive.
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and labor force participation in accounting for the upswing in unemploy-
ment, since
where Pt denotes the working-age population. The increase in the unem-
ployment rate over the course of a recession can be decomposed into two
parts, accounted for by logarithmic variation in the labor force participation
rate and in the employment-population ratio.
Figure 2 shows results of such an exercise. It plots the cumulative log
deviations from trend of the employment-population ratio and the labor
force participation rate, both taken from the CPS, for each of the last 
six recessions. Figure 2 conveys two related messages. First, the record
upswing in the unemployment rate observed in figure 1 is mirrored by a
record contraction in employment: employment declined relative to trend
by 7 log points from the start to the trough of the 2007 recession, dominat-
ing the severe recession of the mid-1970s as well as the joint effects of the
consecutive recessions of the early 1980s.
( ) log log ,1 1d d du u L P E Pt t t t t t= −( ) ( ) − ( )[ ]
6 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Spring 2010
Figure 1. Unemployment Rate, 1948–2010a
Percent  
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Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics data. 
a. Monthly data, seasonally adjusted. Shading indicates recessions. 
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Second, rather than contributing to the rise in unemployment, a reduc-
tion in labor force participation of around 2 log points muted the rise in
joblessness in the 2007 recession. Figure 2 also reveals that the 2007 reces-
sion is no exception in this respect: almost all of the earlier downturns also
exhibit at least a mild procyclicality of labor force participation.
An interesting aspect of the response of labor force participation in the
2007 recession is that it seems to have had two stages. Mary Daly, Hobijn,
and Joyce Kwok (2009a) note that during the first part of the recession, the
labor force participation rate remained unexpectedly high. From May to
December 2009, however, the labor force participation rate fell by 1.2 per-
centage points, its steepest decline since the 1950s.
UNEMPLOYMENT AND GDP (OKUN’S LAW). One of the most robust aggregate
statistical relationships for the U.S. economy is the inverse co-movement
between changes in the unemployment rate and growth in GDP—Okun’s
law (Okun 1962). Figure 3 displays a version of the Okun’s law relation-
ship updated to include the 2007 recession. It plots the quarterly deviation
MICHAEL W. L. ELSBY, BART HOBIJN, and AYS¸EGÜL S¸AHI·N 7
Figure 2. Cumulative Deviations from Trend of the Employment-Population Ratio and
of Labor Force Participation in Six Recessionsa
Log points 
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from trend of the unemployment rate against the contemporaneous percent-
age deviation from trend of GDP, using estimates by the Congressional
Budget Office (CBO) of the nonaccelerating-inflation rate of unemploy-
ment (NAIRU) and potential output up to January 2010.4 The regression
line is based on the observations from 1949 through 2007, thus excluding
the Great Recession. In the absence of large movements in potential out-
put and the NAIRU, Okun’s law implies that for every 2 percentage
points that output falls below trend, the unemployment rate will increase
by about 1 percentage point.
This rule of thumb performs remarkably well in the first part of the 2007
recession, from 2008Q1 through 2009Q1, as indicated in figure 3. Thus, as
we have noted of other dimensions of the 2007 downturn, the adjustment of
the labor market until the second quarter of 2009 is by no means an outlier
relative to past recessions. The last nine months of 2009, however, wit-
8 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Spring 2010
4. Detrended unemployment and output data based on Hodrick-Prescott-filtered series
yield very similar results.
Figure 3. Okun’s Law, 1949–2009
2007 recession
Other recessions
No recession
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Source: Authors’ calculations using BEA, BLS, and CBO data. 
a. Deviation of the actual unemployment rate from its trend. 
b. Deviation of actual GDP from its trend, as estimated by the CBO. 
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nessed an important departure from Okun’s law: even though overall eco-
nomic activity, as measured by GDP, rebounded in the second half, the
unemployment rate continued to rise. This recent divergence between out-
put and the labor market can be traced to high average labor productivity
growth during that period,5 resulting in an increase in the unemployment
rate in 2009 that surprised policymakers and forecasters alike. The excep-
tionally strong productivity growth during the early recovery also occurred
during the jobless recoveries that followed the previous two recessions. We
revisit the implications of this pattern for the current outlook in section III.6
HOURS VERSUS BODIES. The evidence presented thus far has pertained
solely to measures of the number of persons in or out of work, and not to the
number of hours worked per employed person. Here we summarize the
behavior of each of these measures and identify their relative importance in
driving the recent contraction in total labor input. Our point of departure is
another simple accounting identity, namely, that total labor input Ht is the
product of employment Et and hours per worker ht. It follows that the loga-
rithmic decline in total hours worked during the recession may be decom-
posed into the sum of the respective logarithmic declines in Et and ht.
Figure 4 performs this simple accounting exercise using data on employ-
ment and weekly hours per worker in the nonfarm business sector from the
Labor Productivity and Costs program of the Bureau of Labor Statistics
(BLS).7 It plots the cumulative log declines in employment and hours per
worker for each of the last six recessions.8 The figure shows that although
the 2007 recession is unusual in its severity, the adjustment of the labor
market in this recession resembles that observed in prior recessions on two
important dimensions. First, the reduction in hours per worker is steeper
MICHAEL W. L. ELSBY, BART HOBIJN, and AYS¸EGÜL S¸AHI·N 9
5. Mulligan (2009, 2010) argues that the current downturn has been qualitatively differ-
ent from previous severe recessions in that productivity growth remained normal while labor
supply shifted to the left. He concludes that a reduction in labor supply or an increase in
labor market distortions, or both, are major factors in the 2007 recession.
6. Nalewaik (this volume) suggests that the deviations from Okun’s law are less severe
when one considers gross domestic income, the income-based measure of output, rather than
GDP, which is based on the expenditure side of the national accounts. For a detailed analy-
sis of the recent behavior of Okun’s law, see Gordon (2010).
7. The BLS series identifiers used for employment and weekly hours per worker are,
respectively, PRS85006013 and PRS85006023. In constructing these series, the BLS com-
bines data from the Current Employment Statistics and the CPS. Employment here includes
both payroll employees and self-employed and unpaid family workers.
8. The recession dates used to construct figure 4 differ slightly from the official reces-
sion dates established by the Business Cycle Dating Committee of the NBER. They corre-
spond to the quarters around the NBER recession dates over which total hours worked are
observed to decline.
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than that in employment in the early stage of all six recessions, with the
contraction in employment becoming dominant later on. Second, employ-
ment in the 2007 recession fell by 7 log points, as figure 2 showed, but
hours per worker also contracted, by 3 log points. (Total labor input thus
declined by 10 log points, again more than in any other postwar recession.)
This 70:30 bodies-hours split is in line with the conventional wisdom
since at least Arthur Okun (1962) that the extensive margin (the number
employed) accounts for around two-thirds of the cyclical variation in
labor input. Reiterating this point, figure 4 also reveals that across the
last six recessions, variation in employment accounts for approximately
50 to 80 percent of the decline in total labor input.
I.B. Who Has Been Hit Hardest?
Underlying the acute surge in joblessness documented in figures 1
through 4 is a rich heterogeneity in the structure of unemployment across
different groups in the labor force. Here we document this heterogeneity in
the experience of unemployment across groups, focusing on four dimen-
sions: sex, age, race, and educational attainment.
10 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Spring 2010
Figure 4. Cumulative Declines in Employment and Weekly Hours per Worker 
in Six Recessions
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To assess the quantitative importance of these differences, table 1 reports
the ratio of the rise in each group’s unemployment rate to the rise in the
overall unemployment rate for the last five downturns, using data from the
CPS. If the rise in unemployment were spread uniformly across different
subgroups of the labor market, the ratios in table 1 would all equal 1. Instead
we find that males, younger workers, and less educated workers, as well as
members of ethnic minorities, experience steeper rises in joblessness dur-
ing all recessions, including the 2007 recession.9
One aspect of the results in table 1 is worth highlighting. Although
many commentators on the present downturn have emphasized its charac-
ter as a “mancession,” table 1 reveals that all recessions have affected male
workers disproportionately; the mancession is not a new phenomenon.
S,ahin, Joseph Song, and Hobijn (2009) show that this pattern can be traced
to the fact that industries in which male workers are concentrated, such as
construction and durable goods manufacturing, are particularly sensitive to
the business cycle.
I.C. Accounting for the Composition of the Labor Force
Heterogeneity in the experience of unemployment across labor force
groups is an important characteristic of joblessness in the 2007 recession.
Recent decades have witnessed dramatic changes in this heterogeneity. We
focus here on one particular dimension that has a crucial bearing on his-
torical comparisons of unemployment rates: age structure. The labor force
has become older since the 1980s as the baby-boom generation has
aged—a point emphasized by Shimer (1998, 2001).10 Accounting for such
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9. This finding echoes those of an abundant literature that has documented differences
in the cyclical sensitivity of different demographic groups (see Clark and Summers 1981,
Gomme and others 2004, Kydland 1984, and Mincer 1991, for example).
10. The online appendix to this paper (available on the Brookings Papers webpage at
www.brookings.edu/economics/bpea.aspx, under “Conferences and Papers”) presents compo-
sitional adjustments for the full interaction of age, sex, race, and education, as well as for each
dimension individually. Although the changing sex composition of the labor force has had
very little impact, composition by race and education plays a role. The influx of immigrants
since the 1970s has led to a greater fraction of Hispanic workers in the labor force, who in turn
are more likely to experience an unemployment spell. On the other hand, increased educational
attainment since the 1980s has shifted the structure of the labor force toward better-educated
workers, who face lower unemployment rates on average (see Farber and Western 2010 for
more on this topic). Shimer (1998) cautions against adjustments for educational composition,
however. Workers with higher unobserved ability are likely to face lower unemployment rates
conditional on education. As workers become more educated over time, the innate ability of
each education group will decline, leading to an increase in that group’s unemployment rate. In
addition, if the educational distribution shifts, employers may simply revise the educational
requirements of jobs, leading to no real effect on the unemployment rate.
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compositional changes can paint a different picture of aggregate unemploy-
ment trends because each of these different labor force groups is systemati-
cally more or less likely than others to experience spells of unemployment.
We implement a simple method for controlling for the impact of changes
in the age composition of the labor force on trends in aggregate unemploy-
ment: we fix the labor force shares for each age group to their level at some
reference date and then trace out the implied composition-adjusted un-
employment series. Figure 5 performs this exercise using the most recent
labor force shares and reveals an interesting finding: accounting for changes
in age composition leads to a substantial downward revision of past un-
employment rates, such that the age-adjusted unemployment rate in the
2007 recession reached its highest level in the postwar period.
II. Labor Market Flows in the 2007 Recession
Another defining characteristic of the U.S. labor market is that it is in
continual flux. Even when the aggregate economy is tranquil, many
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workers flow in and out of employment and unemployment. In time of
recession these flows come into focus as proximate determinants of
increases in joblessness: Does unemployment rise as a result of increased
inflows as workers lose their jobs? Or does it rise because unemployed
workers increasingly fail to find new jobs? Or is it some combination of
the two?
Based on the shallow downturns of 1990–91 and 2001, recent research
has argued that the nature of labor market adjustment in time of recession
has radically shifted in recent years. Hall (2005a, p. 397) states that “in the
modern U.S. economy, recessions do not begin with a burst of layoffs.”
Echoing this, in his study of unemployment flows, Shimer (2007, abstract)
concludes that “fluctuations in the employment exit probability are quanti-
tatively irrelevant during the last two decades.”11 Instead, in this view,
increased unemployment duration, or a decline in the rate at which workers
flow out of the unemployment pool, drives the entirety of contemporary
variation in unemployment.
In contrast, a long line of research on labor market flows before the last
two recessions came to the conclusion that cyclical ramp-ups in unemploy-
ment are driven by both margins, inflows and outflows.12 More recent work
has revived this conclusion and identified a clear pattern to unemployment
flows in recessions: increases in unemployment are preceded by sharp
rises in unemployment inflows, followed by more prolonged periods of
elevated unemployment duration.13 That literature pointed toward cycli-
cal ramp-ups in unemployment being driven by both margins, with
inflows being relatively more dominant early in recessions.
The 2007 downturn provides an opportunity to assess these conclu-
sions: is a diminished role of job loss a feature of modern recessions, or of
shallow recessions? We explore this question using updated estimates of
unemployment transitions from a variety of data sources.
14 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Spring 2010
11. Shimer (2007) uses the term “employment exit probability” to refer to the probabil-
ity of entering unemployment. We do not use this terminology because employment exit can
be taken to mean a flow from employment to either unemployment or nonparticipation in the
labor force, and may even be taken to mean any separation from employment, which would
also include job-to-job flows.
12. See, among others, Perry (1972), Marston (1976), Blanchard and Diamond (1990),
and Baker (1992).
13. See Braun, De Bock, and DiCecio (2006), Davis (2006), Elsby, Michaels, and Solon
(2009), Fujita and Ramey (2009), Kennan (2006), and Yashiv (2008).
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II.A. The Ins and Outs of Unemployment in the 2007 Recession
A first glimpse of the dynamics of unemployment flows can be obtained
from published time series from the CPS.14 Shimer (2007) describes a
method that uses monthly series on the number of workers employed, the
number unemployed, and the number unemployed for less than 5 weeks to
infer the rates at which workers enter unemployment and unemployed
workers exit unemployment. His point of departure is the following
description of the path of the unemployment stock Ut:
where st and ft are, respectively, the unemployment inflow and outflow
rates, Lt is the labor force, and t indexes months. Although some recent lit-
erature has referred to st and ft as “separation” and “job-finding” rates,
respectively, we instead use the terms “inflow” and “outflow” rates, for
two reasons. First, many separations from employers do not result in a flow
into unemployment, a point to which we return in section II.C. Second, ft
includes flows from unemployment to nonparticipation as well as to
employment. The cyclical properties of the outflow rate in the 2007 and
prior recessions are almost identical to those of transitions from unemploy-
ment to employment in longitudinally linked microdata.15 We focus on the
outflow rate because it is the proximate driving force for the changes in the
unemployment rate, and because it is much more transparent to compute.16
The goal of the analysis is to relate variation in the unemployment rate
ut = Ut /Lt to variation in the flow hazards st and ft. To that end, we first need
( ) ,2 d dU t s L U f Ut t t t t= −( ) −
MICHAEL W. L. ELSBY, BART HOBIJN, and AYS¸EGÜL S¸AHI·N 15
14. Throughout the remainder of this section we focus on unemployment flows esti-
mated from CPS time series, rather than the longitudinally matched monthly CPS microdata
(the so-called gross flows data). This choice is informed by the fact that important measure-
ment issues accompany the use of the gross flows data, including spurious transitions driven
by measurement error in reported labor market states in consecutive monthly surveys, non-
random attrition from the sample, and discrepancies between published changes in aggre-
gate labor market stocks and those implied by the gross flows.
15. It is difficult to make strong statements on the importance of the distinction as one
uses increasingly disaggregated data. The reason is that as one disaggregates the CPS data
further, cell sizes start getting smaller and sampling variance worsens, yielding noisy esti-
mates. This problem is aggravated when one uses longitudinally linked microdata, as in
practice only a fraction of the CPS sample can be matched across months.
16. An implicit assumption underlying equation 2 is that all inflows into unemployment
originate from employment, Lt − Ut. In fact, as we will show in what follows, in the United
States a substantial fraction of inflows originate from nonparticipation. We relax this simpli-
fying assumption in section II.C.
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to estimate these flow rates. Following Shimer (2007), we compute the
monthly outflow probability,
where U<1t+1 is the stock of workers who report having been unemployed for
less than one month.17 Intuitively, the term inside the brackets is the frac-
tion of the unemployed in month t who remain unemployed the next month,
the complement of which is the monthly outflow probability. This can then
be mapped into a Poisson outflow hazard rate ft = −log(1 − Ft).
Obtaining an estimate of the inflow rate is slightly more involved.
Assuming that the flow hazards st and ft and the labor force Lt are constant
between surveys, one can solve equation 2 forward one month to obtain
Here unemployment is a weighted average of the flow steady-state level of
unemployment U*t = stLt /(st + ft) and last month’s unemployment Ut, with
the weight given by the monthly rate of convergence to the steady state, 
λt = 1 − e−(st+ft). Since we observe the labor force and unemployment stocks
in each month, with an estimate of the outflow rate ft in hand, equation 4
becomes a nonlinear equation that can be solved for the inflow rate st. As
emphasized by Shimer (2007), this procedure for estimating st implicitly
corrects for a time aggregation bias arising from inflows within a given
month exiting before the next month’s survey.
Figure 6 plots quarterly averages of the estimated monthly time series
for the rates of inflow to and outflow from unemployment, using the most
recent CPS data up to 2009Q4. The figure highlights a number of interest-
ing properties of the dynamics of unemployment flows in past recessions.
First, as emphasized in the entirety of research on unemployment flows,
both old and new, the outflow rate from unemployment is markedly pro-
cyclical, exhibiting systematic and prolonged downswings in all reces-
sions. Second, the inflow rate into unemployment is countercyclical,
exhibiting sharp upswings at the onset of all recessions that tend to subside
quickly by the end of the recession. Third, the response of unemployment
( ) * .4 11U U Ut t t t t+ = + −( )λ λ
( ) ,3 1 1 11F U U Ut t t t= − −( )[ ]+ +<
16 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Spring 2010
17. As noted by Polivka and Miller (1998) and Abraham and Shimer (2001), the pub-
lished BLS time series on short-term unemployment displays a discontinuous decline fol-
lowing the CPS redesign in 1994, due to a change in the way unemployment duration was
recorded. We correct the published postredesign series by rescaling it by a factor of 1.16.
See Elsby, Michaels, and Solon (2009) for more details.
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inflows in the relatively mild recessions that began in 1990 and 2001
appears to be muted in comparison to other episodes, a point that echoes
the recent conclusions of Hall (2005b, 2007) and Shimer (2007).
At this point we can return to the question that motivated this part of our
analysis: to what extent is the cyclical ramp-up in unemployment accounted
for by changes in these flow hazard rates? Elsby, Ryan Michaels, and Gary
Solon (2009) provide a simple method for answering this question. Their
starting point is the observation, noted by many analysts of U.S. unemploy-
ment flows, that the U.S. unemployment rate is very closely approximated
by its flow steady-state value, that is:
Equation 5 is useful for our purposes because it provides a link between
variation in the unemployment stock and variation in the constituent flow
( ) * .5 18u U L u s s ft t t t t t t ≈ +( )
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Figure 6. Unemployment Inflow and Outflow Rates, 1948–2009a
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a. Quarterly averages of monthly data. Shading indicates recessions.
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18. To see why this is so, note that the sum of the inflow and outflow rates st + ft typi-
cally exceeds 0.5 on a monthly basis in the United States. An implication is that the rate of
convergence to flow steady state λt in equation 4 tends to be very high in practice.
12178-01a_Elsby_rev4.qxd  8/11/10  12:06 PM  Page 17
hazard rates. Elsby, Michaels, and Solon (2009) show that simple log dif-
ferentiation of this approximate relationship implies that
Equation 6 has a simple message: to compare changes in inflow and out-
flow rates on an equal footing with respect to changes in unemployment,
all one needs to do is compare the logarithmic variation in each of the flow
hazards.
Figure 7 depicts the results from applying this decomposition of un-
employment variation for each recession since 1973. We identify start and
end dates for each recessionary ramp-up in unemployment since 1973 and
compute the cumulative logarithmic difference in inflow and outflow rates
relative to their values at the start of the recession. In many ways figure 7
confirms the qualitative picture suggested in figure 6. In all recessions,
inflows account for a substantial fraction of unemployment variation early
( ) log log ,6 11 1 1Δ Δ Δu s f ut t t t t t≈ −[ ] = −− − −β βwhere ut −( )1 .
18 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Spring 2010
Figure 7. Cumulative Changes in Unemployment Inflow and Outflow Rates 
in Six Recessionsa
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on and then subside. In contrast, the contribution of the outflow rate
becomes more dominant as each recession progresses.
For our current focus, there are two noteworthy aspects of figures 6 and 7.
First, mirroring the conclusions of section I on labor market stocks, the
behavior of unemployment flows in the initial stages of the current down-
turn bears a striking resemblance to the dynamics of unemployment flows
in past severe recessions. The early quarters of the current ramp-up in
unemployment are characterized by a wave of inflows that has since partly
receded. The contribution of the inflow rate is almost identical to that
observed in the 1974 downturn. Thus, to return to the question that moti-
vated this analysis, sharp spikes in the rate of inflow into unemployment
appear to be a feature of severe recessions, rather than only of older ones.
Figures 6 and 7 also shed light on what is new about the current down-
turn. Figure 6 reveals that the unemployment outflow rate fell to a historic
low of 24 percent in 2009Q3. This is not just a consequence of the secular
trend toward declining outflow hazards shown in figure 6: figure 7 shows
that the outflow rate fell by over 80 log points in the current downturn,
more than in any of its postwar counterparts, echoing the conclusion of
section I that this is the deepest postwar downturn in terms of labor market
outcomes. We return to this phenomenon in section III, when we discuss
its implications for the recovery.
II.B. Unemployment Flows by Labor Force Group
In section I.B we showed that changes in unemployment rates have dif-
fered substantially across demographic groups during the 2007 recession,
with some groups hit harder than others. We now look into the sources of
this heterogeneity by examining unemployment flows across groups.
We focus on the same four dimensions of heterogeneity as in section
I.B. Estimation of the flow hazards for each labor force group mirrors the
aggregate analysis above.19 Figure 8 displays the series for the inflow and
outflow hazards for each group. They are calculated as 12-month moving
averages to smooth out noise induced by the greater sampling variance that
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19. The BLS publishes seasonally unadjusted estimates of unemployment by duration
starting from the mid-1970s by sex, age, and race. As in section I.B, for education groups we
use the CPS monthly microdata files from January 1976 onward to construct measures of the
number unemployed less than 5 weeks, the total number unemployed, and the total number
employed, by group. We then seasonally adjust the raw data using the Census’ X12 proce-
dure and compute the monthly outflow and inflow rates using the analogues to equations 3
and 4 that hold for each group. As before, we also correct for discontinuities in the series for
short-term unemployment by group induced by the redesign of the CPS in 1994.
12178-01a_Elsby_rev4.qxd  8/11/10  12:06 PM  Page 19
20 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Spring 2010
Figure 8. Unemployment Flows by Demographic or Educational Group, 1976–2009a
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a. Twelve-month moving averages of monthly data. Shading indicates recessions. Logarithmic scale.
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accompanies these more disaggregated series. In accordance with the mes-
sage of equation 6, the flow hazards are plotted on log scales.
Figure 8 has a rich set of implications for the structure of joblessness
across groups. Perhaps its most prominent feature is the remarkable uni-
formity in both the levels and the cyclical behavior of outflow rates across
groups within each dimension (left-hand panels). Most striking are the
series by education group, for which the exit rates are virtually indistin-
guishable since 1976 (echoing the findings of Mincer 1991). In the 2007
recession the log decline in outflow hazards is almost identical across
groups in all dimensions. Reductions in the outflow rate that accompany
recessions, from both a qualitative and a quantitative perspective, are truly
an aggregate phenomenon.
In stark contrast, there are large differences in rates of inflow into unem-
ployment across groups (right-hand panels of figure 8). Comparison of these
with the heterogeneity of unemployment across groups in table 1 reveals a
close link: the same groups that face high unemployment rates—young
workers, less educated workers, and workers from ethnic minorities—also
face markedly high rates of entry into unemployment. This comparison indi-
cates that the bulk of the large differences in unemployment across groups
observed in table 1 is driven by differences in each group’s propensity to
enter unemployment, rather than differences in the duration of their spells.
In addition to revealing large differences in the levels of unemployment
across groups, table 1 demonstrated that some groups face greater increases
in unemployment in time of recession. What can account for this? Recalling
equation 6, we can write the change in group j’s unemployment rate as
One possibility, then, is that these groups simply faced larger logarithmic
changes in their constituent flow hazards. Figure 8 reveals that this is 
precisely what accounts for the surge in unemployment of men relative 
to women in the current recession: male and female outflow rates have
been essentially identical, but men have faced a much larger increase in
inflows—a point emphasized by S, ahin and others (2009).20
( ) log log ,
, , , ,
7 1Δ Δ Δu s fj t j t j t j t≈ −⎡⎣ ⎤⎦−β βwhere j t j t j tu u, , , .− − −= −( )1 1 11
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20. These authors explore this phenomenon using longitudinally linked monthly CPS
microdata to estimate labor market flows among unemployment, employment, and nonpartici-
pation. Consistent with figure 8, they find that for men the employment-to-unemployment tran-
sition rate increased more than it did for women, whereas the unemployment-to-employment
transition rate declined proportionally across the two groups.
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But this is not the whole story. For age, race, and education groups,
there is little difference in the cyclicality of unemployment flows, and
what differences exist tend to predict the opposite of the pattern depicted
in table 1. For example, in the 2007 recession, outflow rates among
young workers aged 16 to 24 fell just as much as for older workers, and
their inflow rates have hardly risen. Yet in table 1 the unemployment
rate among 16- to 24-year-olds rose substantially more than aggregate
unemployment.
The answer to this puzzle lies in equation 7: for values of the group-
specific unemployment rates uj,t observed in table 1 (as for all values lying
below one-half), βj,t−1 is increasing in uj,t−1. Thus the higher the unemploy-
ment rate faced by an individual group, the greater the responsiveness of
the group’s unemployment rate to changes in its constituent flow hazards.
Intuitively, equation 7 implies that changes in the flow hazards have a log-
arithmic influence on unemployment: a doubling of, for example, the
inflow hazard leads to an almost doubling of the unemployment rate. The
higher a group’s unemployment rate, then, the more cyclically sensitive that
rate is.
Figure 8 reveals that this observation can account entirely for the
greater cyclical sensitivity of unemployment among youth, ethnic minori-
ties, and the less educated in the 2007 recession, and indeed in all reces-
sions over the sample period. Combining this with our earlier observation
that the bulk of the differences in unemployment levels, and thereby of βj,
across groups can be attributed to differences in rates of entry into unem-
ployment yields an interesting implication: the majority of the variation in
both the levels and the cyclical sensitivity of group unemployment rates
can be accounted for by differences in the level of inflow rates across
groups.
II.C. The Role of Job Loss in the 2007 Recession
The previous sections have shown that unemployment inflows are a
proximate driving force of the increase in unemployment in the 2007 reces-
sion, and that they play an important role in accounting for cross-sectional
differences in the level and cyclicality of unemployment across groups. It
is tempting to conclude that this constitutes evidence that job loss has
played a key role in the 2007 recession. In this section we delve into this
observation to uncover the mechanisms that can account for these elevated
inflow rates.
We address two important conceptual distinctions. First, as mentioned
above, estimates of the unemployment inflow rate, st based on equation 4,
22 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Spring 2010
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are based on the implicit assumption that all inflows into the unemploy-
ment pool originate from employment rather than nonparticipation. In fact,
new entrants and reentrants to the labor force account for around 40 percent
of the unemployment stock. Consequently, estimates of st conflate two eco-
nomically distinct driving forces for entry into unemployment: flows from
nonparticipation brought about by the process of labor force entry, and
flows from employment to unemployment that are associated with elevated
rates of job loss.
Second, job loss is often taken to mean a separation from an employer
rather than an inflow into the unemployment pool. But workers leaving an
employer can, and frequently do, line up new jobs without an intervening
unemployment spell, a point that has been made since Peter Mattila (1974)
and more recently by Bruce Fallick and Charles Fleischman (2004) and
E´va Nagypál (2008). In what follows, we bring to bear a range of additional
data that speak to these distinctions.
UNEMPLOYMENT INFLOWS BY REASON FOR UNEMPLOYMENT. It is possible to
distinguish among different sources of unemployment flows using publicly
available monthly time series from the CPS on the total number unem-
ployed and the number unemployed for less than 5 weeks by reason for
unemployment. We focus on three main reasons for unemployment: job
loss (layoffs), job leaving (quits), and labor force entry.21 An important
benefit of this breakdown is that the first two categories originate from
employment whereas the third originates from nonparticipation, allowing
us to distinguish flows from employment to unemployment associated
with job loss from the flows from nonparticipation to unemployment that
accompany labor force entry.22
MICHAEL W. L. ELSBY, BART HOBIJN, and AYS¸EGÜL S¸AHI·N 23
21. One can further decompose job losers into those on temporary versus those on per-
manent layoff, and labor force entrants into new entrants and reentrants. We do not distin-
guish among these, principally because the redesign of the CPS in 1994 led to substantial
changes in the definitions of these subgroups and associated discontinuities in their time
series. See Polivka and Miller (1998).
22. A potential concern when distinguishing between job leavers and job losers in the
CPS data is that the distinction, much like the unemployment-nonparticipation distinction,
can be blurred. Poterba and Summers (1984) find that although few job losers alter their
reported reason for unemployment from month to month, around 25 percent of job leavers in
May 1976 reported in the next month’s survey that they lost their job. We are less concerned
about this for two reasons. First, as shown in figure 9, job leavers make up such a small frac-
tion of unemployment inflows that such response error is unlikely to distort the job loser
inflow rate, our primary focus in this section. Second, we will show in figure 11 that the
cyclical properties of the job loser inflow rate implied by household responses in the CPS are
strikingly similar to those of the layoff separation rate implied by establishment responses in
the JOLTS data.
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Elsby, Michaels, and Solon (2009) describe how these data can be used to
infer estimates of unemployment flows by reason for unemployment.23 Fig-
ure 9 shows that, as these authors emphasize, all of the observed counter-
cyclicality in the aggregate inflow rate noted above is driven by a markedly
countercyclical layoff inflow rate. The quit inflow rate is comparatively very
low and mildly procyclical, thereby dampening the observed countercycli-
cality of aggregate inflows. In addition, inflows due to labor force entry are
essentially acyclical, further moderating the rise in the aggregate inflow rate
in time of recession.
The impression given by figure 9, and one that is a unifying theme of
the present paper, is that the behavior of unemployment inflows by reason
24 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Spring 2010
23. There is a slight difference between the method used by Elsby, Michaels, and Solon
(2009) to compute inflow rates by reason for unemployment and that used by Shimer (2007)
to compute the aggregate inflow rate. Elsby and coauthors use a discrete time correction 
for time aggregation bias, whereas Shimer uses a continuous time correction. The results
reported in Elsby, Michaels, and Solon (2009) suggest that this difference is not quantita-
tively important.
Figure 9. Unemployment Inflows by Reason for Unemployment, 1968–2009a
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Source: Authors’ calculations based on the method of Elsby, Michaels, and Solon (2009) using BLS data. 
a. Quarterly averages of monthly data. Shading indicates recessions.
b. Includes both reentrants and new entrants.
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in the current downturn is again very reminiscent of past recessions. The
behavior of the layoff inflow rate in particular suggests a simple two-way
classification of recessionary episodes: deep recessions, such as that start-
ing in 1974, the Volcker disinflation period of the early 1980s, and the
present downturn, are characterized by markedly elevated layoff inflow
rates; milder recessions, such as those starting in 1990 and 2001, are typi-
fied by a more modest increase in inflows due to layoffs. Again, the mes-
sage of the 2007 recession is that severe modern recessions share many of
the characteristics of deep recessions in the past.
EVIDENCE FROM LABOR TURNOVER. The fact that unemployment inflows
rose markedly in the 2007 recession, and that layoff inflows dominated
that trend, is suggestive of job loss playing a key role in driving cyclical
rises in unemployment. But it is not necessarily conclusive. As noted by
George Perry (1972) and recently reemphasized by Hall (2005), elevated
rates of inflow into unemployment need not be the outcome of elevated
rates of separation from employers: increased inflows in time of recession
can occur if workers are increasingly unable to line up new jobs immedi-
ately upon separation. Under this alternative hypothesis, countercyclical
inflows are a symptom of declining rates of job finding among potential
job-to-job movers, rather than of elevated rates of job loss.
The 2007 recession provides a unique opportunity to assess these compet-
ing hypotheses: it is the first recession covered from its onset by the new Job
Openings and Labor Turnover Survey (JOLTS).24 This is crucial for our 
present purpose because it provides a representative measure of the rate at
which employed workers separate from their employers in the United States.
More formally, denote the separation rate from employers by σt, and the
employment-to-unemployment inflow rate by seut . Note that a measure of the
latter is given by the sum of the layoff and quit inflow rates presented above,
seut = sl,t + sq,t. It follows that we can relate σt and seut simply according to
where pt denotes the probability that a worker who separates from her
employer in month t subsequently flows into unemployment.
Figure 10 plots the published JOLTS time series for the separation rate
σt and the employment-to-unemployment transition rate s teu implied by the
CPS data. These series reveal a stark set of facts. First, the two rates differ
( ) ,8 s pteu t t= σ
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24. JOLTS data are available only back to December 2000 and therefore miss part of the
ramp-up in unemployment in the 2001 recession.
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substantially at all points in time, a fact that is suggestive of the abundance
of job-to-job transitions in the U.S. economy, as emphasized by Fallick and
Fleischman (2004) and Nagypál (2008). Second, whereas the employment-
to-unemployment inflow rate has increased in the current downturn, the
separation rate has, if anything, fallen slightly. At first blush, then, it would
seem that the elevated rate of inflow into unemployment during the 2007
recession is driven wholly by reductions in the rate at which workers line
up new jobs.
The results presented in figure 10 would seem to provide ample support
for Hall’s (2005) hypothesis that in today’s economy, job loss has little to do
with increased unemployment in time of recession. We argue that such a
conclusion would be premature. It has long been recognized that the rela-
tively modest cyclical behavior of separations masks substantial cyclicality
in its constituent elements: quits and layoffs. These tend to display markedly
opposite cyclical patterns: the quit rate moves procyclically, whereas the
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Figure 10. Separation Rate and Employment-to-Unemployment Transition Rate,
1998–2009
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a. Monthly data and rates. Shading indicates recessions.
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unemployment or not.
c. Includes all transitions from employment to unemployment.
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layoff rate moves countercyclically.25 Figure 11 plots economy-wide layoff
and quit rates from the JOLTS data for the current downturn and reveals that,
as with unemployment flows, the behavior of labor turnover is again remark-
ably consistent with historical trends in these series.
Accounting for the difference between quits and layoffs allows a more
revealing investigation of the relationship between separations and un-
employment inflows than in equation 6. The employment-to-unemployment
transition rate can be decomposed as follows:
( )
, , , , , ,
9 1s p p p pteu l t l t q t q t t l t t q t= + = + −( )σ σ ω ω⎡⎣ ⎤⎦
p
t
t
  
σ ,
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Figure 11. Separations and Unemployment Inflows from Quits and Layoffs, 1998–2009
19991998 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Percent of employmenta
Source: Authors’ calculations using BLS data. 
a. Monthly data and rates. Shading indicates recessions. Logarithmic scale.
b. Includes all voluntary separations, whether transitioning to another job or to unemployment or to nonpartici-
pation.
c. Includes all involuntary separations, whether transitioning to another job or to unemployment or to
nonparticipation.
d. Includes only involuntary separations, leading to unemployment.
e. Includes only voluntary separations, leading to unemployment.
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25. See, for example, Slichter (1919), Woytinsky (1942), Akerlof, Rose, and Yellen
(1988), and Anderson and Meyer (1994).
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where subscripts l and q, respectively, denote layoffs and quits, σ = σl + σq
is the aggregate separation rate, and ω = σl/σ is the share of layoffs in
aggregate separations. Equation 9 therefore highlights an additional chan-
nel by which employment-to-unemployment transitions may increase,
namely, through changes in the composition of separations (layoffs versus
quits) that occur during recessions ω.26
Figure 11 clarifies this point. It depicts the quit separation rate σq from
the JOLTS data along with the quit inflow hazard into unemployment sq
derived from the CPS data using the method described in the previous sec-
tion. At all points in time, workers who quit their previous job face a very
low probability of subsequently entering unemployment: pq averages just
16 percent over the sample period. Job-to-job flows drive an important
wedge between separations and unemployment inflows due to quits. It is
for this reason that quits account for only a small fraction of unemploy-
ment inflows. In addition, the implied series for pq displays no cyclical pat-
tern: it fell steadily from approximately 20 percent in 2001 to 14 percent 
in 2009. These two observations—that pq is small, and that it has not risen
in the current downturn—account for why the contribution of quits to
increased unemployment inflows is not significant in the current downturn.
A quite different story holds for layoffs. Figure 11 shows that, at all
points in time, laid-off workers face a very high probability of entering
unemployment: pl averages 91 percent since 2001. Job-to-job flows do not
appear to be prevalent among laid-off workers. Moreover, although the
gap between the separation and the inflow rates for layoffs closed in the
early part of the current downturn, the rise in pl accounts for only a small
fraction of the overall rise in unemployment inflows, and for perhaps one-
quarter of the overall rise in the layoff inflow rate.
Figure 11 therefore provides a unique perspective on the rise in un-
employment inflows during the 2007 recession. As suggested by Hall
(2005), elevated rates of entry into unemployment are not driven by
increases in the overall rate at which workers separate from employers.
But in contrast to the claims of recent literature, job loss nonetheless plays
a crucial role in accounting for recessionary unemployment: increased
inflows into unemployment can be traced to a shift in separations during
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26. As with so much of the analysis of unemployment flows, this compositional point was
first noted by Perry (1972), who refers to workers flowing into potential unemployment as pos-
sessing “lottery tickets” for avoiding entry into unemployment. In his words, “Those who enter
the flow because they quit voluntarily have better lottery tickets than those who enter it
because they are laid off. Since quits fall and layoffs rise when unemployment rises, the qual-
ity of the average lottery ticket of workers in the pool . . . will deteriorate. . . .” (p. 267).
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the recession toward layoffs, and these laid-off workers are very likely to
flow into unemployment. An increase in the layoff rate therefore played a
central role in accounting for the increased rate of entry into unemploy-
ment in the 2007 recession.
III. Outlook for Recovery in the Labor Market
Until now we have concentrated on analyzing the behavior of labor market
stocks and flows associated with the rise in unemployment in the 2007
recession. In this section we turn to the prospects for the labor market
going forward.
Two features of figure 6 provide a first glimpse of the central features
that will guide the recovery. First, since the spike in the unemployment
inflow rate has largely subsided, the key to any future decline in un-
employment is a recovery of the outflow rate. Second, the decline in the
outflow rate that has accompanied the 2007 recession has been much more
severe than in past recessions, making its recovery all the more salient.
One can think of the relative strength of the rebound in the outflow rate
as determined by two things. First, how many new job openings will be
created? Second, for a given increase in the number of vacancies, how
quickly will the pool of unemployed find new jobs?
III.A. Vacancy Creation
Job creation reflects the overall health of the economy, and it is
expected that as aggregate activity recovers, vacancy creation will also
start to increase. However, many factors affect the timing and the level of
vacancy creation during recoveries.
One positive factor for the recovery from the 2007 recession is the
additional strength in vacancy creation due to the alleviation of the credit
constraints that resulted from the financial crisis. Moreover, since the res-
olution of the financial crisis is likely to cause a substantial decline in
aggregate and individual uncertainty, firms’ willingness to hire could
increase significantly. In particular, the passing of the crisis implies a 
drastic reduction in the probability of a detrimental aggregate economic
outcome. As Ben Bernanke (1983) points out, such a reduction in the prob-
ability of “bad news” will increase the likelihood that firms will make the
decisions to invest and hire, which are costly to reverse.
There are also reasons to imagine that the factors that explain the job-
less recoveries of the 1990–91 and 2001 recessions are likely to be absent
during the current episode. Tim Willems and Sweder van Wijnbergen
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(2009) argue that labor hoarding can explain the jobless recoveries follow-
ing the two earlier recessions. Labor hoarding is more likely during shal-
low recessions but much less likely during a deep recession like that of
2007, which exhibited sharp rises in rates of job loss. Similarly, Thijs van
Rens (2004) and Kathryn Koenders and Richard Rogerson (2005) have
argued that firms used the previous two recessions as an opportunity to
improve their organizational efficiency and productivity. Since the 2001–07
expansion was neither exceptionally long nor very strong, it seems that the
forces that might have limited hiring after the 1990–91 and 2001 reces-
sions are much less likely to have a large and persistent effect during this
recovery. However, the strength in productivity growth in the second half
of 2009 that led to the deviation from Okun’s law depicted in figure 3 may
suggest that these forces are still present.
On the downside, some firms have considerable unused labor capacity
in the form of part-time workers. As of December 2009, part-time workers
who would prefer to work full-time made up 6.7 percent of total employ-
ment. Daly, Hobijn, and Kwok (2009b), among others, have argued that
the pace of hiring relative to output growth during the recovery could be
slowed by firms first increasing the hours of those already employed.
Finally, there are reasons to suspect that labor market changes over the
last two decades will render any sharp reversal in employment less likely.
For example, firms’ use of temporary layoffs has declined, and with it the
possibility of increasing employment at low cost.27 In addition, the sharp
recovery following the 1980s recession may have been aided by the rever-
sal of the disinflationary monetary policy that instigated the recession in
the first place, a feature the 2007 recession does not share.
III.B. Match Efficiency and the Beveridge Curve
An important concern for the strength of the recovery is that even if
firms create new jobs, it may be harder than in the past to match workers
with appropriate job openings. Figures 12 and 13 reveal the main reason
for this concern.28 Figure 12 illustrates, for the period 1951–2009, the rela-
30 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Spring 2010
27. See Groshen and Potter (2003) for a detailed discussion.
28. Figures 12 and 13 are updated versions of figures 4 and 6 in Shimer (2005). For
expositional purposes we plot monthly rather than quarterly data. To account for this change
in frequency, we use a value of 2700000 for the smoothing parameter of the Hodrick-
Prescott (HP) filter, which is used to filter the trend in log levels of all variables. This corre-
sponds to the value that Shimer (2005) uses, corrected for the change in frequency using the
factor for stock variables derived by Ravn and Uhlig (2002). The vacancy series is based on
Barnichon (2010), who builds a vacancy posting index for the years 1951–2009 by combin-
ing information from the total print and online help-wanted advertising indexes with the
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tionship between logarithmic deviations from Hodrick-Prescott-filtered
trends of vacancies and of the unemployment rate—the Beveridge curve.
The fitted regression line is based on all observations before 2008, and
90 percent confidence intervals are shown. As noted by Shimer (2005), his-
torically there has been a remarkably stable negative association between
job openings and the unemployment rate. As the figure shows, during the
fall of 2009 the unemployment rate was higher than would be implied by
the historical Beveridge curve.
Figure 13 investigates the sources of this deviation from past trends. It
plots the logarithmic deviations from Hodrick-Prescott-filtered trends of
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Figure 12. The Beveridge Curve, 1951–2010a
–40 –20 0 20 40
2007 recession
Other recessions
No recession
Deviation of job vacancies from trend (log points)
Deviation of the unemployment rate from trend (log points)
Source: Authors’ calculations using data from BLS and Barnichon (2010). 
a. Monthly data. Dotted lines are 90 percent confidence intervals around the fitted regression line.
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JOLTS data. As discussed in Shimer (2005), the growth of Internet vacancy postings since
the mid-1990s, together with newspaper consolidation and the equal opportunities legisla-
tion of the 1960s, makes it hard to compare the level of vacancies over time. Shimer uses a
low-frequency HP filter to remove these trends. In addition, the series we use from Barni-
chon (2010) are robust to a range of possible higher-frequency paths for the diffusion of
Internet vacancy postings. The cyclical component of the vacancy series that we use moves
consistently with economic activity over the business cycle.
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the outflow rate from unemployment ft, and of the ratio of the number of
vacancies to the number of unemployed, a measure of labor market tight-
ness. Shimer (2005) refers to the remarkably stable positive relationship
between these measures as the “matching function.” The figure reveals that
the recent divergence from the Beveridge curve can be traced to the out-
flow rate being substantially lower than would be suggested by the match-
ing function relationship observed over much of the postwar period. The
substantial decline in the outflow rate witnessed in the latter part of 2009
(figure 6) therefore represents a significant outlier in the context of the his-
torical matching function.
The recent breakdown of the Beveridge curve and matching function
relationships shown in figures 12 and 13 is evocative of the similar break-
down in match efficiency during the period of high European unemploy-
ment in the 1980s and 1990s (see, for example, figure 11 in Layard,
Nickell, and Jackman 1991). This raises the concern that the U.S. econ-
omy may become plagued by the same persistently high unemployment
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Figure 13. The Matching Function, 1951–2010a
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Source: Authors’ calculations using data from BLS and Barnichon (2010). 
a. Monthly data. Dotted lines are 90 percent confidence intervals around the fitted regression line.
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rates that Europe experienced—the so-called hysteresis effect. In prac-
tice, hysteresis can arise through a number of channels. We highlight a
few of these possibilities here and attempt to gauge their relevance in the
current downturn.
MISMATCH BETWEEN WORKERS AND JOBS. One potential reason for a persis-
tent reduction in match efficiency is a mismatch between the skills of work-
ers and the skill requirements of job openings. For example, Erica Groshen
and Simon Potter (2003) have argued that the jobless recoveries after the
1990–91 and 2001 recessions were in large part due to structural reallo-
cation of workers across sectors.29 They claim that this reallocation led to
a mismatch in the skill mix that resulted in a slower adjustment of the
labor market than in previous recessions. More recently, Edmund Phelps
(2008) has reiterated this concern with respect to construction and finance
workers in the 2007 recession.
This reallocation argument suggests that workers formerly employed
in sectors in structural decline will have a harder time finding new jobs
than other workers. That is, it implies a divergence in outflow rates from
unemployment between these two groups of workers. Figure 14 addresses
this question by showing unemployment outflow hazard rates conditional
on the industry in which a worker was employed at the start of the un-
employment spell. If anything, these outflow rates have converged rather
than diverged as the structural reallocation argument implies.30
Besides a mismatch in skills, an additional concern is the potential
emergence of geographical disparities in the location of workers and of job
openings. This issue came into focus in the 2007 recession amid concerns
that, given the decline in home prices that accompanied the recession, job
applicants are more reluctant to apply for and accept jobs that are not
within commuting distance and would require them to sell their home. Fer-
nando Ferreira, Joseph Gyourko, and Joseph Tracy (2008), using data from
the American Housing Survey for 1985–2005, find that homeowners with
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29. Related to this argument, Aaronson, Rissman, and Sullivan (2004) point out that the
need to reallocate labor across sectors in the 1990–91 and 2001 recessions, which were
accompanied by jobless recoveries, seemed no greater than in earlier ones. Valletta and
Cleary (2009) reach the same conclusion for the 2007 recession.
30. Although this finding is suggestive, it need not imply that skill mismatch is not an
issue in the 2007 recession. For example, it may be the case that skill mismatch exists but
occurs within industry classifications. In that case, disaggregation by industry would be too
broad to detect an increase in skill mismatch. However, estimation of further disaggregated
unemployment flows is limited by the increased sampling variance that would accompany
additional splitting of the CPS sample.
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negative equity are less likely than other homeowners to move.31 Their
results cannot be easily extrapolated to the 2007 recession but still point to
a potentially important negative effect of housing-related problems on
labor market recovery, since geographic mobility is an important part of
adjustment to shocks in the U.S. labor market, as emphasized by Blanchard
and Lawrence Katz (1992).32
SCLEROSIS AND DURATION DEPENDENCE. Associated with the record rise
in the unemployment rate in the 2007 recession has been a surge in long-
term unemployment. The fraction of the labor force unemployed for more
than 6 months has increased by a staggering 3.5 percentage points to a
postwar high of 4 percent, 1.5 percentage points higher than the previous
34 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Spring 2010
Figure 14. Unemployment Outflow Rates in Selected Industries
Outflow hazard rate (log scale)
Source: Authors’ calculations using BLS data. 
a. Twelve-month moving averages of non-seasonally adjusted data. Shading indicates recessions.
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
0.25
0.50
0.13
1.00
Construction
Total
Information
Durable goods
Financial
31. Some commentators on the 2007 recession have pointed to recent data showing that
the rate of domestic migration in the United States has reached a postwar low. However, it is
difficult to discern how much of this decline is associated with the recession; rates of inter-
nal migration have been falling as a secular phenomenon since the mid-1980s (see, for
example, Frey 2009).
32. This implication of Blanchard and Katz (1992) has been the source of some dispute,
however. See, for example, Rowthorn and Glyn (2006).
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high in 1983. Likewise, average unemployment duration has risen to a his-
toric high of more than 30 weeks—the mirror image of the historic low in
the unemployment outflow rate noted in section II. Here we explore the
effects of these depressed unemployment flows on the likely path of the
recovery, what Samuel Bentolila and Giuseppe Bertola (1990) and Blan-
chard (2000) have referred to as “sclerosis” in the European context.33
A first potential source of sclerosis relates to the effect of reductions in
unemployment outflow rates on the speed of adjustment of the unemploy-
ment rate. This point can be clarified in terms of equation 4: reductions in
the pace of worker reallocation, st + ft, lead to reductions in the responsive-
ness of unemployment to changes in flow steady-state unemployment, u*t =
st /(st + ft). This matters for the recovery of unemployment in the wake of
the 2007 recession: a by-product of the historically low outflow rate
reached during this recession is that the rate of convergence of unemploy-
ment to its flow steady state, λt in equation 4, has also arrived at a postwar
low. Thus, even if firms start to hire again, the outflow rate rebounds, and
flow steady-state unemployment recovers, the actual unemployment rate
may exhibit a delayed reaction.
Quantitatively, however, we find that these effects are likely to be
small. Although the recent trough in the monthly outflow rate of 24 percent
is a record low by historical U.S. standards, it remains very high in com-
parison with rates in Europe during the 1980s, which fell below 8 percent
in many European economies.34 To put this in perspective, the half-life of
a deviation of unemployment from flow steady state, which stood at a little
over 1 month before the current downturn in the United States, has risen to
just under 3 months in recent U.S. data but is not even close to the 9 months
to a year experienced in Europe in the 1980s and early 1990s.35
A second source of sclerosis is the persistence in the decline of the out-
flow rate itself. Previous literature has identified the duration composition of
unemployment as a key potential driving force for such persistence (Blan-
chard 2000). Specifically, a pervasive feature of U.S. unemployment flows
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33. We use the term “sclerosis” in the sense of Blanchard (2000, p. 2): “Flows decrease,
individual unemployment duration increases, and so does the proportion of long-term
unemployed.”
34. Hobijn and S, ahin (2009, table 1) report average duration distributions of unemploy-
ment spells, and Elsby, Hobijn, and S, ahin (2009) document the behavior of inflow and outflow
rates over time for a broad number of industrialized countries. Even the unemployment-to-
employment transition rate for the United States (currently around 20 percent on a monthly
basis) substantially exceeds the outflow rate (the sum of the unemployment-to-employment
and unemployment-to-nonparticipation flow rates) in many European countries.
35. These figures are computed from estimates in Elsby, Hobijn, and S, ahin (2009, figure 3).
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is that average rates of outflow from unemployment decline as the duration
of unemployment spells rises—so-called negative duration dependence—a
point noted first by Hyman Kaitz (1970) and more recently by Shimer
(2008).36 Several explanations have been proposed for such an outcome,
including depreciation of the skills of the unemployed (Pissarides 1992,
Ljungqvist and Sargent 1998), employers’ ranking of job applicants by the
duration of their unemployment spell (Blanchard and Diamond 1994), and
statistical discrimination by employers against the long-term unemployed
(Lockwood 1991).
Here we highlight some potential reasons why such duration depen-
dence can matter for labor market conditions over the cycle. Noting that
the aggregate outflow probability Ft can be expressed as a share-weighted
sum of the outflow probabilities faced by each duration group d, Ft = Σd
ωdtFdt, it follows that changes in the aggregate outflow probability over
time can be decomposed according to
Equation 10 summarizes two potential concerns about the role of duration
dependence in the 2007 recession. First, given the surge in long-term un-
employment, it is tempting to hypothesize that workers with longer un-
employment spells have increasingly become disenfranchised from the labor
market, leading to a disproportionate decline in their outflow rates. Such
an effect would be captured by the first term in parentheses in equation 10.
Figure 15 addresses this question by presenting time series for a range
of outflow rates for workers with different unemployment durations. Spe-
cifically, we use longitudinally linked monthly CPS microdata from 1976
onward to compute the probability that a worker unemployed for a given
duration exits unemployment within a month. Figure 15 plots the associ-
ated hazards for durations of less than 1, 1 to 3, 3 to 6, and 6 or more
months. Consistent with the literature on negative duration dependence in
unemployment exit rates, the hazard for exiting unemployment declines as
duration rises. More important for the hypothesis under discussion, how-
ever, there is no evidence that exit rates have fallen disproportionately
among the high-duration unemployed in the last five recessions. Rather,
( ) .10 1Δ Δ ΔF F Ft dt dt dt dtd= +( )−∑ ω ω
36 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Spring 2010
36. As noted by Kaitz (1970), this phenomenon may take the form of “spurious” dura-
tion dependence that arises from dynamic selection (Salant 1977), or of “true” duration
dependence whereby the accumulation of unemployment duration has a causal effect on out-
flow rates.
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just as we showed in section II.B on unemployment flows by group, the
cyclicality of outflow rates displays an extraordinary regularity across
duration groups. In sum, there appears to be little evidence that elevated
rates of joblessness are a symptom of diminished employment opportuni-
ties for the long-term unemployed in the 2007 or any other recession.37
However, equation 10 also reveals that duration dependence can affect
the cyclicality of the aggregate outflow rate through changes in the dura-
tion structure of unemployment, Δωdt. Formally, a simple description of
the stock of unemployed workers of duration d over time t is
( ) ,11 11 1 1u F udt d t d t+ − −= −( )
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Figure 15. Unemployment Outflow Probabilities by Duration of Unemployment,
1976–2009a
3–6 months
Percent of unemployed
Source: Authors’ calculations using CPS data. 
a. Quarterly averages of monthly data. Shading indicates recessions.
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37. Interestingly, this conclusion mirrors the results of Machin and Manning’s (1999,
p. 3086) detailed analysis of the long-term unemployment problem in Europe: “While the
longterm unemployed do leave unemployment at a slower rate than the shortterm unemployed,
this has always been the case and their relative outflow rate has not fallen over time.”
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with initial condition u0t given by the unemployment inflow derived in
section II. It follows that the unemployment share of duration group d is
given by
Equation 12 has significant implications for the path of the outflow rate
during the recovery. It reveals that the unemployment shares of the high-
duration unemployed are persistent, and in particular that they depend on
the outflow rates faced by the low-duration unemployed that prevailed in
the past. Intuitively, even if outflow rates have moved uniformly across
duration groups during the 2007 recession, the historic decline in outflow
rates as a whole can result in a persistent residue of long-term unemployed
workers who exit unemployment slowly, depressing aggregate outflow
rates in the future.
To illustrate the potential importance of this mechanism, figure 16 sim-
ulates the future path of the aggregate outflow rate in the wake of the 2007
( ) .12 11 1 1 1ω ωdt d t t t d tF u u+ − + −= −( )( )
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Figure 16. Simulated Unemployment Outflow Rates, 2010–11a
3–6 months
Percent
Source: Authors’ calculations.
a. Monthly data. The simulation assumes that outflow rates for each duration group recover at the same rate as 
in the 1983–84 recovery. For purposes of comparison, the rebound in the aggregate outflow rate in that period is 
plotted.
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recession, assuming that outflow rates for each duration group, as well as
the aggregate inflow rate, rebound in proportion to what was witnessed 
in the last recovery from a deep recession, that of 1983–84. For compari-
son, figure 16 also plots an alternative path for the aggregate outflow rate,
indexed to the actual recovery observed in 1983–84.
Figure 16 suggests that the accumulation of long-term-unemployed
workers in the 2007 recession can indeed have quantitatively important
effects on the rebound in the outflow rate during the recovery. Whereas the
aggregate outflow rate rebounded by around 30 percent in the 1983–84
recovery, the simulated path for the upcoming recovery augurs a more
lackluster 15 percent.
The difference between these two paths is largely due to the low out-
flow rates prevailing at the end of 2009. Hence, even if these rates were to
rebound at the same growth rate as in 1983, they would remain at a lower
level than in 1983, leading to a higher average duration of unemployment,
even in the long run. Although this is definitely a cause for concern, it is
unlikely that this mechanism will lead to the degree of persistence in the
outflow rate that marked the hysteresis seen in European unemployment in
the 1980s and 1990s. The simple reason is that the long-term unemployed
in the United States flow out of unemployment at a rate that is four times
higher than the aggregate outflow rates in continental Europe reported in
Elsby, Hobijn, and S, ahin (2009).
THE ROLE OF EMERGENCY UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION. One particularly
salient reason for a temporary decline in match efficiency relates to the
temporary extension of federal Emergency Unemployment Compensation
(EUC) that began in June 2008. In addition to the regular 26 weeks of
unemployment insurance (UI), workers may be eligible for 53 additional
weeks of EUC as long as Congress continues to extend it.38 Conventional
economic theory suggests that this lengthening of the expected duration
of unemployment benefits will place downward pressure on the unemploy-
ment outflow rate seen in figure 13, as those searching for a job become
more selective about which job offers they accept.
Existing research on the effects of UI benefits suggests a strong positive
relationship between their maximum duration and the average unemployment
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38. EUC is divided into four tiers (20 weeks, then 14, then 13, and finally another 
6 weeks); recipients must reapply when each tier expires. In addition to these 53 extra
weeks, most states offer extended benefits of up to 20 weeks. The number claiming these
benefits has been relatively small.
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spell. Estimates suggest that a 1-week increase in potential benefit duration
is associated with an increase in the average duration of the unemployment
spells of UI recipients of around 0.08 to 0.20 week (see Moffitt 1985, Katz
and Meyer 1990, Meyer 1990, Card and Levine 2000, Krueger and Meyer
2002). According to these estimates, then, a 53-week extension in potential
benefit duration would be associated with an average 4.2- to 10.6-week
increase in unemployment duration among UI recipients.39 Since the frac-
tion of unemployed workers claiming some form of UI benefits has aver-
aged 50 percent in the 2007 recession, this suggests something like a 2.1- to
5.3-week increase in overall unemployment duration. Over the course of the
2007 recession, average unemployment duration surged from 16.5 weeks to
30.2 weeks, a 13.7-week increase. This back-of-the-envelope calculation
therefore suggests that EUC can account for as much as 15 to 40 percent of
the rise in aggregate unemployment duration. This is a potentially substantial
effect, which corresponds to between 0.7 and 1.8 percentage points of the
5.5-percentage-point rise in the unemployment rate.
There are reasons to believe, however, that the true effect of extended
UI benefits on unemployment duration is likely to be at the lower end of
these estimates. Many of the larger estimates of the effect are based on
data from the 1970s and 1980s, when temporarily laid-off workers, who
are more responsive to the generosity of UI, made up a larger fraction of
unemployment. In addition, many of the larger estimates in the literature
are based on empirical strategies that identify the effect of UI by exploiting
differences in benefit schedules across states and time. As Card and Levine
(2000) point out, however, many states extend UI benefits as a response to
poor job-finding prospects in recessions, so that this approach may over-
state the true disincentive effect of UI. Indeed, Card and Levine’s esti-
mates based on an exogenous policy change lie at the low end of the range
of effects, suggesting a more modest impact of EUC.
NOT ALL VACANCIES ARE ASSOCIATED WITH JOB CREATION. A final reason for
the observed decline in match efficiency could be that the measured stock
of vacancies overstates the true number of job openings in the economy.
Evidence from microdata on vacancies presented by Steven Davis, Jason
Faberman, and John Haltiwanger (2009, figure 5) suggests that establish-
ments whose employment is not growing nevertheless post vacancies.
They estimate that these firms have a vacancy rate of about 2 percent of
40 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Spring 2010
39. This calculation assumes that, upon entering unemployment, all unemployed work-
ers anticipate that benefit duration will be extended by 53 weeks. In that sense it is an upper
bound on the response.
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employment. Interestingly, this is about equal to the aggregate vacancy
rate observed during the second half of 2009. This suggests that a substan-
tial part of the vacancies reported in the latter half of 2009 may be associ-
ated not with job creation, but rather with a minimum level of vacancy
postings that exists regardless of the level of net job growth.
Taken together, our analysis of the decline in match efficiency observed
in the latter stages of the 2007 recession points to two potentially important
driving forces: the existence of a substantial residue of long-term unem-
ployed workers with relatively weak search effectiveness, and the exten-
sion of EUC. Taking these separately, one might imagine that the temporary
nature of EUC implies that the labor market will recover as these benefits
are withdrawn, whereas the structural nature of the long-term unemploy-
ment problem will cause it to endure well into the recovery. However,
there are likely to be important interactions between the two factors. A
major impetus for the introduction of the EUC program was in fact the rise
in long-term unemployment that accompanied the recession. Thus an
enduring long-term unemployment problem could mean that the political
will to withdraw EUC may take some time to materialize.
IV. Conclusion
Our detailed analysis of the adjustment of the labor market in the current
downturn reveals it to be the deepest deterioration in labor market outcomes
on record in the postwar era. Every indicator of labor market activity sug-
gests that the recession has been unique in both its depth and its duration.
Rates of joblessness among all groups in the labor market have reached his-
toric postwar highs. There is little doubt that it is a Great Recession.
Nonetheless, our analysis suggests that many of the features of labor
market dynamics in the Great Recession through the latter half of 2009 
are strikingly similar to those seen in earlier recessions. This is true of the
behavior of employment and the labor force participation rate, the use of
the intensive versus the extensive margin in the adjustment of labor input,
and the differential impact on demographic groups, with young workers,
male workers, less educated workers, and workers from ethnic minorities
hit harder than others.
In terms of the underlying flows, just as in earlier deep recessions,
increased joblessness in the current downturn can be traced to both increased
rates of inflow into unemployment and increased duration of unemployment
spells, with higher inflows relatively more important early on in the down-
turn. This suggests that the more modest response of unemployment inflows
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in the 1990–91 and 2001 recessions is a feature of mild recessions rather
than of modern ones.
Further analysis of worker turnover data from the new Job Openings
and Labor Turnover Survey provides a unique perspective on the driving
forces of job loss in the 2007 recession. Recent literature has emphasized
the relatively acyclical behavior of the rate at which workers separate from
employers, suggesting that job loss plays only a limited role in driving
recessionary unemployment. Combining data from JOLTS and the CPS
reveals that increased inflows into unemployment have been driven pre-
dominantly by a change in the composition of separations toward layoffs,
which are very likely to lead to unemployment, and away from quits,
which are very likely to lead to a new job upon separation. Thus, contrary
to recent claims, increases in layoffs have played a key role in driving
increased unemployment in the recession.
Although the labor market response in the early stages of the 2007
recession has resembled that in prior downturns, more recent evidence
suggests an important divergence from past trends. Most prominently,
rates of exit of unemployed workers from joblessness have slowed to
record low levels, drawing into focus the importance of a rebound in out-
flow rates for the recovery. Recent data point to two key factors. First, the
record rise in long-term unemployment associated with the recession is
likely to yield a persistent overhang of workers facing long unemploy-
ment spells, slowing the recovery. Second, the extension of EUC starting
in June 2008 is likely to have led to a modest increase in long-term un-
employment in the recession.
Despite these unfavorable forces, recent data suggest that the problems
facing the U.S. labor market going forward are unlikely to be as severe as
the European hysteresis problem of the 1980s. Although the jobless in the
United States are exiting unemployment at a historically slow rate, they
nonetheless leave unemployment as much as four times faster than their
counterparts in continental Europe in the 1980s. Looking ahead, then, a
tentative expectation is for a lackluster recovery, but one not nearly as dis-
mal as seen in Europe in the past.40
42 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Spring 2010
40. Even after the unemployment rate recovers, labor market disturbances associated
with the recession are likely to have important and potentially long-lasting effects on work-
ers. Since Ruhm (1991), and Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan (1993), research has empha-
sized that the negative effects of displacement go beyond a temporary unemployment spell,
as displaced workers often suffer substantial wage losses even after reemployment. Sullivan
and von Wachter (2009) argue that job displacement might also have an effect on mortality,
with annual death hazards 10 to 15 percent higher for high-seniority displaced male workers
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20 years after displacement. The recession might also have negative effects on the careers of
new labor market entrants. Oreopoulos, von Wachter, and Heisz (2006) find that students
graduating in a recession start work at lower-paying employers, with permanent effects on
low-skilled graduates.
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Comments and Discussion
COMMENT BY
LAWRENCE F. KATZ Michael Elsby, Bart Hobijn, and Ays¸egül S¸ahin
have produced a superb descriptive empirical analysis of U.S. labor mar-
ket stocks (unemployment, employment, and hours of work) and flows (into
and out of unemployment) during the 2007 recession. This recession has
generated particularly trying times for U.S. workers and their families and
clearly merits being denoted as the Great Recession. The authors carefully
document that the 2007 recession has been the most severe labor market
downturn since World War II as measured by the increase in the unemploy-
ment rate, the peak age-adjusted level of the unemployment rate, the rise and
level of unemployment durations, and the decline in employment and the
employment-population ratio. And they convincingly show that labor mar-
ket adjustment in this recession has been qualitatively similar to that in past
deep downturns along three key dimensions: the demographic composition
of the rise in unemployment, with larger increases for males, the less edu-
cated, and the young; the split of the contraction in labor input into declines
in bodies employed (70 percent) and in hours per worker (30 percent); and
the combination of an initial increase in unemployment driven by a sharp
rise in unemployment inflows from layoffs followed by continuing increases
in unemployment from a large decline in unemployment outflow rates.
The authors also find that the deterioration in labor market conditions
from late 2007 to early 2009 followed the historical cyclical negative rela-
tionship between job openings (vacancies) and unemployment (that is,
moving down the Beveridge curve with rising unemployment and falling
vacancies). In other words, rising unemployment through the first quarter
of 2009 looked like a very severe but normal cyclical phenomenon. But
they show that the unemployment rate continued rising in 2009 after the
job openings rate stabilized, so that the unemployment rate in late 2009
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and early 2010 was much higher than would be implied by the historical
Beveridge curve. The authors complement this finding with evidence of
a downward shift in the job matching function and of deviations from
Okun’s law (higher unemployment than justified by the GDP gap) starting
in the second quarter of 2009 and continuing into early 2010. These pat-
terns suggest the emergence of structural unemployment problems: mis-
matches between unemployed workers and potential new jobs and/or
the exacerbation of the longer-term structural problems associated with
trends of rising wage inequality and declining employment opportunities
in traditional middle-class jobs (Goldin and Katz 2007).
I find little to disagree with in the paper’s excellent empirical analy-
sis and discussion. I do have some concerns about drawing conclusions
about the nature of labor market adjustments using data on labor market
quantities alone and not using any information on labor market prices
(wages). Robert Shimer flags this issue in his comment, and Jordi Galí
(2010) examines the U.S. wage Phillips curve and aggregate wage behav-
ior through 2009Q3.
In the remainder of my comment I will briefly discuss two issues. The
first is the possible sources of the potential emerging structural unemploy-
ment problems suggested by the outward shift in the Beveridge curve since
early 2009; the second is the likely longer-term human costs of the sharp
rise of unemployment in the Great Recession.
Elsby, Hobijn, and S¸ahin argue that the substantial extensions of the
potential duration of unemployment benefits (up to 99 weeks) in the current
downturn could be contributing to the increased duration of unemployment
and the outward shift of the Beveridge curve. They emphasize the tradi-
tional disincentive effects on job search effort from unemployment insur-
ance (UI). Shimer in his comment posits that an increase in the duration and
availability of UI benefits reduces the pressure on real wages from the
unemployed and thereby slows labor market adjustment in a downturn.
But the most compelling micro research using discrete policy changes or
sharp regression discontinuity strategies suggests only modest impacts
of UI extensions on search effort and on the duration of unemployment
of UI recipients (Card and Levine 2000; Schmieder, von Wachter, and
Bender 2009). Furthermore, previous estimates of larger impacts on unem-
ployment duration for the United States (Katz and Meyer 1990) are based
on data from the 1970s and early 1980s, in which much of the responsive-
ness comes from firms and industries using temporary layoffs and from
the sensitivity of recall dates to UI benefits. This layoff-recall process is
much less important today than it was in the downturns of that era.
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UI extensions also have important consumption smoothing benefits for
the unemployed (Gruber 1997), and much of the impact on job search effort
comes from reducing liquidity (credit constraint) problems rather than tradi-
tional job search disincentives (Chetty 2008). Traditional microeconomic
estimates of the impact of UI on the unemployment durations of UI recipi-
ents further tend to overstate the aggregate impact by ignoring the spillover
effects of shorter unemployment spells for unemployed workers not receiv-
ing UI benefits (Levine 1993). They also ignore the macroeconomic stimu-
lus arising from increased consumption expenditure by UI recipients, which
raises both aggregate demand and demand for labor during a deep recession.
UI extensions may also improve longer-run employment levels by keeping
more of the long-term unemployed attached to the labor market rather than
moving onto disability programs. Thus emergency UI extensions are likely
to raise contemporaneous measured unemployment by more than they
actually reduce employment, since those receiving benefits are more likely
than other jobless workers to indicate in labor force surveys that they are
searching for work, leading to a shift in the classification of workers from
out of the labor force to unemployed.
Regional labor market problems and geographic disparities in the loca-
tion of job seekers and potential job openings may be an underlying source
of structural unemployment problems. Relative to workers in other nations,
U.S. workers have always been highly mobile, and their moves in pursuit of
new opportunities have enhanced U.S. economic dynamism. High rates of
geographic labor mobility have allowed the United States to recover more
rapidly from adverse economic shocks and to have smaller regional unem-
ployment differences than European nations with less mobile workforces
(Blanchard and Katz 1992).
But the geographic mobility of U.S. workers has declined over the last two
decades and has fallen sharply in the Great Recession since 2007 (Frey 2009).
Three factors may account for this change. First, the housing market crisis
and large home price declines in many regions may have generated a geo-
graphic lock-in effect: if homeowners with negative equity are hesitant to sell
their home at a loss, mobility from distressed areas will be reduced (Ferreira,
Gyourko, and Tracy 2009). Second, the subprime crisis has created economic
distress in precisely those fast-growing areas, such as California, Florida,
and Nevada, that have absorbed workers from declining regions in the
past, thus further slowing the movement of labor from declining to expanding
regions that ordinarily helps drive U.S. job recoveries. Third, lingering credit
market problems, especially for potential new start-ups, hinder job creation
even in economically vibrant locales, reducing labor mobility to these areas.
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The sharp cyclical downturn of the Great Recession comes on the heels
of a three-decade increase in U.S. wage inequality and educational wage
differentials. The former has been linked to rapid skill-biased technological
change associated with computerization and to a slowdown in the growth of
average educational attainment (Goldin and Katz 2008). The finance boom
of the 1990s to 2007, some aspects of globalization and offshoring, and
weakening U.S. labor market institutions have exacerbated these wage
inequality trends. Technological changes and increased offshoring opportu-
nities over the last 20 years have contributed to a polarization of the U.S.
labor market, with strong growth in high-end, high-skill jobs and in tra-
ditionally lower-wage jobs in the in-person service sector, but particularly
weak demand for traditional middle-class jobs such as manufacturing pro-
duction jobs and middle management positions (Autor, Katz, and Kearney
2006, Autor 2010). The typical high-wage jobs of non-college-educated
men, as well as many middle-class jobs for those with college training, have
been hard hit. The housing market boom and bubble of 2002–06 obscured
some of these trends by buoying demand for non-college-educated men in
construction. The Great Recession has reinforced the longer-term jobs
polarization and wage inequality trends, with huge declines in construction,
manufacturing, and middle management employment.
These long-term structural labor market problems suggest that substantial
mismatches between the skills and aspirations of job losers (especially the
long-term unemployed) and the skill requirements and compensation pack-
ages of new job openings are likely to emerge as the economy recovers from
the Great Recession. Many job losers from sectors such as construction and
manufacturing may face difficulties in making the necessary psychological
and financial adjustments, as well as in obtaining the training and education
required for the new jobs available in the growing (primarily service) sectors.
Elsby, Hobijn, and S¸ahin conclude from similar large declines in unem-
ployment outflow rates across aggregate industries since late 2007 (their
figure 14) that increased sectoral shifts and mismatch are unlikely to be
a driving force behind the apparent outward shift in the Beveridge curve.
But skills mismatch is difficult to measure using such broad industry clas-
sifications. And Jinzu Chen, Prakash Loungani, and Bharat Trehan (2010)
document a huge shock to the dispersion of stock market returns across
industries at the start of the Great Recession and find that this stock market–
based measure of sectoral shocks is a strong predictor of the path of long-
duration unemployment rates.
Two particularly worrisome signs suggestive of longer-term structural
labor market problems and persistent costs of unemployment from this
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recession are the concentration of the rise in unemployment among per-
manent job losers and the huge increase in long-term unemployment.
Much research demonstrates that permanently displaced workers and the
long-term unemployed face particularly difficult labor market adjust-
ments (Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan 2003, Couch and Placzek 2010).
Workers displaced from long-term jobs in the early-1980s recession
faced large earnings declines upon reemployment and still had 20 percent
earnings losses 15 to 20 years after displacement (von Wachter, Song, and
Manchester 2009). The health consequences of permanent loss of a long-
term job are also severe, with a 50 to 100 percent increase in mortality the
year following displacement, 10 to 15 percent increases in mortality rates
20 years after displacement, and an implied loss of life expectancy for a
worker aged 40 at displacement of 1 to 1.5 years (Sullivan and von Wachter
2009). The health problems and mortality increases from job loss are
strongly positively associated with larger permanent earnings losses. A sub-
stantial number of permanent job losers also end up on the disability insur-
ance rolls as they become discouraged in their search for new jobs, and
many have multiple health problems (Autor and Duggan 2003). Parental
job loss also appears to have adverse impacts on children, including
poorer schooling outcomes and worse labor market outcomes as adults
(Oreopoulos, Page, and Stevens 2008, Stevens and Schaller 2009).
Policies designed to help displaced workers make the transition to
new jobs, gain valuable new skills, and reduce their earnings losses may
be necessary to try to combat the potential for large and persistent adverse
impacts on well-being arising from today’s high level of long-term
unemployment. Permanent job losers often are reluctant to accept new
job offers below their pre-separation wage, and they often spend a long
time searching for a job like their previous one, even when prospects are
much brighter in other sectors and for other types of jobs. This leads to a
form of long-term “retrospective wait unemployment,” particularly for
long-tenure workers displaced from declining sectors. A potential policy to
address these issues and supplement unemployment benefits for likely
permanent job losers is wage-loss insurance (also called wage insurance),
which (at least temporarily) subsidizes earnings upon reemployment when
the wage on the new job is less than that on the old job (Babcock and
others 2009). Also, although the economic returns to further education and
training at community colleges that lead to degrees and certificates are
high for dislocated workers (Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan 2005), the
existing employment service programs and job training systems created
under the Workforce Investment Act are fragmented and difficult for many
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workers to navigate. Improvements in reemployment services and access
to training and education for permanently dislocated workers could reduce
some of the long-term costs of the current downturn.
Sector-focused training programs (also known as sectoral employment
programs) have emerged over the last 15 years as a particularly promising
approach to workforce development. Sectoral employment programs work
closely with local employers to create industry-specific programs that pre-
pare and connect unemployed and underskilled workers to employers
seeking to fill skilled vacancies, for example in allied health professions,
information technology, and skilled manufacturing jobs. These sectoral
employment programs, originally initiated by nonprofit, community-based
organizations, have developed strong connections to employers and to
the broader community. Early evaluations suggest that well-run versions
of these programs can be quite successful in placing workers in high-
quality jobs and in improving hourly and annual earnings (Maguire and
others 2009).
Finally, the sharp decline in employment opportunities for teenagers
and young adults in the Great Recession raises further longer-run worries.
Young workers entering the labor market during a deep recession are
likely to see reduced earnings for 10 to 15 years thereafter, relative to those
graduating from high school or college in more normal times (Oreopoulos,
von Wachter, and Heisz 2008, Kahn 2010). The returns to high school and
postsecondary training are quite high in the current labor market, suggest-
ing the need for policies to make it easier for young people to stay in school
during a severe downturn.
There are some hopeful signs and some worrisome signs in the labor
market and enrollment data for youth and young adults in the Great Reces-
sion. The employment-population ratio for 16- to 24-year-olds declined
sharply (by about 8 percentage points) from the fall of 2007 to the fall of
2009. The decline in employment for this age group has resulted in bifur-
cated responses, with a rise in enrollment rates and a rise in the share both
out of school and out of work (the idleness rate). The school enrollment
rate among 20- to 24-year-olds increased by 3 percentage points overall
and by 5 percentage points for blacks from the fall of 2007 to the fall of
2009. And the college enrollment rate of new high school graduates
reached a record level of 70.1 percent in the fall of 2009 (Bureau of Labor
Statistics 2010). The idleness rate among teens and young adults has
increased most for males (especially black males). A major open ques-
tion involves the current activities of and longer-run prospects for these
idle males. One worry is that criminal involvement may rise in response to
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poor legitimate labor market opportunities, leading to longer-run scarring
effects in the labor market for those who end up with serious criminal
records. But at least through the first half of 2009, property and violent
crime rates sharply declined during the Great Recession, suggesting that
reduced demand for criminal output has outweighed potential increased
criminal activity among more idle youth. Trends in the labor market, edu-
cational, and criminal activities of young people will be important to mon-
itor going forward, to contribute to our understanding of the ultimate social
consequences of the Great Recession.
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COMMENT BY
ROBERT SHIMER1 Michael Elsby, Bart Hobijn, and Ays¸egül S¸ahin
offer a thorough and convincing description of some key labor market out-
comes during the Great Recession. They focus first on the behavior of tradi-
tional stock measures, including employment, unemployment, and hours,
and show that by any measure, this has been the deepest labor market
contraction during the postwar period. They then turn to the flows in
and out of employment, which they show are qualitatively similar to
those in previous recessions. In particular, the onset of the recession was
accompanied by a sharp spike in layoffs, which pushed many workers
into unemployment. This process peaked by the end of 2008, so that by
the end of 2009, almost all of the increase in unemployment was accounted
for by an unprecedented decline in the unemployment outflow rate. Except
for some small anomalies in the relationships among unemployment,
vacancies, and the unemployment outflow rate in the latter half of 2009,
they conclude that the labor market during the Great Recession behaved
just as it did during every previous postwar recession, except for the
size of the contraction.
I think this story is basically right as far as it goes, and so I do not want
to spend too much time on the details of their analysis.2 But it also sidesteps
one important question: why did the shock that instigated the recession—
the financial crisis, the construction contraction, the loss in housing and
financial wealth, or whatever it might have been—result in such a big
decline in employment and increase in unemployment duration? To answer
that, it seems useful to go back to a basic model of labor supply and
demand. As I will show, the model fails spectacularly during this recession,
but its failure is instructive.
The model I will write down should not be controversial. Most modern
theories of employment and hours worked, including the real business
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1. I am grateful to Christopher Nekarda of the Federal Reserve for providing me with
data in spreadsheet form for figure 3 on the number of workers collecting extended benefits
and emergency unemployment compensation.
2. One minor comment: Elsby, Hobijn, and S¸ahin argue that “the measured stock of
vacancies overstates the true number of job openings in the economy.” This is based on the
observation that even during normal times, many firms list vacancies but do not hire. I think
this reflects a misunderstanding of what a vacancy is. A firm has a vacancy if it would like to
hire but has not yet done so. In fields where good labor is scarce, vacancies may stay unfilled
for months. But there is no reason to think that the desire to hire in these fields should have
remained constant during the Great Recession. That is, there is no reason to think that there
is a floor on the aggregate vacancy rate.
12178-01b_Elsby comments_rev1.qxd  8/11/10  12:07 PM  Page 57
cycle model (Kydland and Prescott 1982) and the “three equation” New
Keynesian model that forms the foundation of Michael Woodford’s (2003)
analysis, assume that hours worked are determined by the intersection of
individuals’ labor supply curves with firms’ labor demand curves. Even
job search models effectively assume that wages and hours are determined
by labor supply and demand, but that fluctuations in demand are dampened
because search frictions act like an adjustment cost (Shimer 2005, 2010;
Rogerson and Shimer 2010).
I focus here on the simplest specification of preferences and technology.
A representative individual has period-t utility defined over consumption ct
and hours ht. Suppose in particular that utility is
where γ > 0 measures the disutility of work and ε > 0 is the Frisch labor
supply elasticity. The most important piece of this parametric assumption
is that income and substitution effects cancel, so there is no long-run trend
in hours worked.3 The individual faces a period budget constraint,
She enters a period with some initial financial wealth at, earns a pretax
wage wt per hour of work ht, pays a proportional labor tax τt, and con-
sumes ct, leaving her with financial wealth bt, which is then invested in any
available assets. I am deliberately vague about the set of available assets;
in particular, markets may be complete or incomplete. Combining the first-
order conditions for consumption and hours gives
which equates the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and
hours to the after-tax wage. Note that the key assumption is that a worker
is free to increase or decrease both her consumption and her labor supply at
a fixed wage. I will return to this assumption later.
( ) ,1 1
1
γ τεc h wt t t t= −( )
b a w h ct t t t t t= + −( ) −1 τ .
log c ht t− +
+γ ε
ε
ε
ε
1
1
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3. I have discussed elsewhere the importance of this specification of utility for the
general results that I present here; see, for example, Shimer (2010) for more details.
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Similarly, a representative firm has access to a Cobb-Douglas produc-
tion technology that uses capital k and labor h to produce output. The firm
chooses its inputs to maximize its per-period profits,
where At is total factor productivity, α is the capital share of income, and rt
is the rental rate on capital. Letting yt = Atkαt h1−αt denote total output, the
first-order condition for the choice of labor is
which equates the marginal product of labor to the wage. This holds as long
as the firm is free to vary its labor at a fixed wage. Introducing adjustment
costs on capital, for example, also does not affect this conclusion.
Eliminate the wage between equations 1 and 2. Note that ct and ht in
equation 1 denote consumption and hours per capita. Letting yt and ht in
equation 2 similarly denote output and hours per capita, I obtain
The left-hand side of equation 3 is the proportion of labor income left after
taxes, multiplied by the labor share 1 − α and divided by the disutility of
work γ. The right-hand side is the product of the consumption-output ratio
ct /yt and hours worked ht raised to an exponent (1 + ε)/ε ≥1. The labor mar-
ket clearing model predicts some co-movement between the consumption-
output ratio and hours per capita in response to a shock to any variable not
in this equation, such as a financial crisis, a collapse in construction, or a
loss of housing and financial wealth.
To explore whether this relationship is a good description of the data,
I use empirical measures of the consumption-output ratio and hours
worked in the United States. I measure c as nominal expenditure on non-
durable goods and services, and y as nominal GDP.4 Following Simona
( ) .3 1 1
1
−( ) − = ⎛⎝⎜
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4. Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2007) construct a measure of consumption that
includes the flow of services from durables. This does not much affect the results.
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5. The labor market variables are available from the BLS since June 1976. Data for earlier
years can be downloaded from Cociuba’s website (sites.google.com/site/simonacociuba/
research). I seasonally adjust these monthly data using the Census X11 algorithm and then
take quarterly averages.
Source: Author’s calculations.
a. The labor wedge is (1 – τ
t
), implicitly defined by equation 3. Shaded bands indicate recessions.
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Figure 1. Log Labor Wedge, 1951–2009a
Cociuba, Edward Prescott, and Alexander Ueberfeldt (2009), I measure
hours per capita as the number of people at work times average hours per
person at work divided by the population over age 16 (all from the Current
Population Survey).5 For simplicity’s sake, I fix the labor supply elasticity
at ε = 1 but stress that all comparisons between the latest recession and pre-
vious ones are unaffected by this choice of elasticity. Finally, I normalize
γ = (1 − α)(1 − τt) at t = 2009Q4, the end of the sample.
I plot in figure 1 the logarithm of the right-hand side of equation 3. A
few patterns stand out. First, labor market clearing implies significant time
variation in labor taxes at low frequencies. Arguably this is consistent
with the data; for example, Robert Barro and Charles Redlick (2009) find
that the average marginal tax rate increased from 1950 until 1981 and then
fell modestly through 2006. More pertinent, the theory implies that taxes
must have increased during almost every recession, and in particular shows
that 1 − τt fell by 19.0 log points during 2008 and 2009. Like many authors
before me (see, for example, Parkin 1988; Rotemberg and Woodford 1991,
1999; Hall 1997; Mulligan 2002; and Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan 2007),
I view this prediction of the theory as implausible and instead call these
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6. The Bureau of Economic Analysis does not maintain a measure of real consumption
of nondurables or of services before 1995, and so I cannot construct this series directly.
Using real total consumption gives similar results.
Figure 2. Marginal Rate of Substitution between Consumption and Hours Worked and
Marginal Product of Labor, 1951–2009a
Source: Author’s calculations.
a. Each series has been reduced by a constant 0.47 percent quarterly growth. Shaded bands indicate recessions.
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cyclical movements in 1 − τt the “labor wedge,” that is, the part of labor
market fluctuations that a labor market clearing model cannot explain.
It is worth emphasizing the magnitude of the current increase in the labor
wedge. The peak-to-trough decline in 1 − τt exceeded 10 log points in only
three previous postwar recessions: it was 10.9 log points from 1952Q4 to
1954Q3, 11.2 from 1956Q3 to 1958Q1, and 10.3 from 1979Q4 to 1981Q4.
The decline from 2008Q1 to 2009Q4 is nearly twice as large, 19.0 log
points. If macroeconomists were already concerned before the Great Reces-
sion with the empirical validity of imposing labor market clearing, the
assumption should be untenable today.
By breaking equation 3 back down into its components, the marginal
rate of substitution (MRS) in equation 1 and the marginal product of labor
(MPL) in equation 2, one can get a better understanding of why this the-
ory failed. I measure the real MPL as the ratio of real GDP to total hours
and then infer the real MRS as 1 − τt times the MPL.6 Since both the MRS
and the MPL have trended upward over time with general growth in the
economy, I remove a constant 0.0047 quarterly growth from both lines for
visual convenience. The results, presented in figure 2, are stark. The MRS
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accounts for virtually all of the cyclical movement in the labor wedge.7
Although there are low-frequency movements in the MPL, business cycle
fluctuations are very small. If anything, recessions appear to be periods
where the MPL falls. The only exception to this pattern occurs in 2009,
when the MPL increased by 4.8 log points (3.4 log points after detrend-
ing), an outcome that I will return to shortly.
These findings, or at least the pattern before 2009, are consistent with
an environment where the real wage is fairly rigid and firms are always
on their labor demand curve. That is, the path of the MPL simply reflects
movements in the real wage. A recession, then, is a time when labor
demand falls without an offsetting decline in the real wage, lowering the
equilibrium level of hours worked. On the other hand, the real wage typ-
ically exceeds the MRS, so workers are not on their labor supply curve.
The decline in firms’ demand for labor during recessions makes this prob-
lem particularly acute. Recent work on rigid wages in search models,
starting with Robert Hall (2005), offers a theoretical framework in which
this possibility can be considered.8 The patterns that Elsby, Hobijn, and
S¸ahin highlight, including the spike in layoffs early in a recession and the
persistent increase in unemployment duration later on, can be understood
through the lens of these models.
In closing, I want to consider the unprecedented increase in the MPL,
reflecting an unprecedented increase in the real wage, from the first to the
fourth quarter of 2009.9 One possible explanation is that the economy has
been shedding its least productive, lowest-wage workers. Concern about
this type of compositional effect is the justification that Elsby, Hobijn, and
S¸ahin give for not discussing real wages in their paper (see their footnote 2).
But there are some problems with this story. Why don’t these compositional
effects show up in earlier recessions, when the MPL typically fell or at least
remained constant? Why don’t they show up earlier in the Great Recession,
when total hours were declining at a faster rate? Indeed, it is not even clear
62 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Spring 2010
7. See Galí, Gertler, and López-Salido (2007) for a similar conclusion with a different
interpretation.
8. Rogerson and Shimer (2010) evaluate the role that search frictions play in macroeco-
nomic models and conclude that the possibility that search may lead to rigid wages is one of
its most important roles.
9. This may simply reflect measurement error in GDP, which is subject to numerous
revisions. The gap between GDP and gross domestic income might give some support to
that hypothesis (Nalewaik, this volume). But even if GDP in the fourth quarter of 2009 is
subsequently revised down by a couple of percent, the MPL will still have increased sharply
during the year.
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how compositional effects should work at business cycle frequencies. To
the extent that wage rigidities force workers out of high-wage jobs into
positions for which they are overqualified, the changing composition of
jobs artificially inflates the procyclicality of wages and productivity.
This suggests a second possible explanation for the behavior of the
MPL. In a low-wage environment with nominal wage rigidities, firms may
be unable to reduce wages in response to adverse shocks. This leads to lay-
offs and raises the real wage and the productivity of surviving workers.
But Elsby, Hobijn, and S¸ahin show that the pace of layoffs slowed during
2009. An explanation is still needed for why firms hired relatively few
workers during 2009, and the link between that finding and nominal wage
rigidities is more tenuous.
A third possibility is that firms are not hiring because of credit market
frictions. But if the assumption is that credit market frictions reduced cap-
ital investment, the MPL should have fallen, not increased. So instead the
model must be one in which credit market frictions reduce firms’ ability
to hire, either because of difficulties in financing payrolls or because
hiring entails upfront recruiting and training costs, with deferred benefits.
Since capital purchases may be more easily collateralized than payroll
expansions, such a model may be empirically plausible. This hypothesis
merits more serious exploration when appropriate data are available.
A fourth possibility is that various well-intentioned government inter-
ventions have kept unemployed workers from putting downward pressure
on wages. One example is extensions in the potential duration of unem-
ployment benefits, which Elsby, Hobijn, and S¸ahin discuss. Current law
allows workers to collect unemployment benefits for up to 99 weeks in
most states, a duration never before experienced in the United States. As I
write this in April 2010, extending benefits by another 13 weeks is being
debated. As a result of both the policy change and the depth of the reces-
sion, 11.5 million workers were collecting benefits in March 2010, 73 per-
cent of all the unemployed. Only once before, in 1975, was the insured
unemployment rate higher, as I show in figure 3. This unprecedented exten-
sion of benefits dramatically changes the composition of the unemployed
population. For example, whereas the uninsured unemployment rate peaked
at 5.8 percent in 1983, it never exceeded 3.8 percent during the current
recession and was only 2.7 percent in March 2010. It seems unlikely that
real wages will fall without more pressure from the unemployed. Viewed
through the lens of the MRS and the MPL, the prognosis for a strong labor
market recovery without a large preemptive change in labor market policy
is poor.
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Figure 3. Share of Unemployed Workers Receiving Unemployment Benefits,
1970–2010a
Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Unemployment Insurance Weekly Claims Report.  
a. Shaded bands indicate recessions.
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GENERAL DISCUSSION Robert Hall suggested dropping the frame-
work for analyzing unemployment based on inflows and outflows in favor
of a richer environment where separations and hires are as important as
entry and exit from unemployment. The “ins-and-outs” model is limited
because a first-order feature of the labor market escapes it completely,
namely, cyclical variation in the fraction of separations that are followed
by unemployment rather than by new jobs or exit from the labor force. In a
strong labor market, the biggest outflow is into other jobs, with little or no
intervening time out of the labor force or in unemployment. But in a reces-
sion, that fraction declines dramatically, creating a wide gap between sep-
arations and unemployment that Arthur Okun called the “Perry pothole,”
after George Perry described it in a 1972 Brookings Paper. Hall further
noted that the present paper emphasizes a distinction between quits and
layoffs, whereas models using bargaining theory do not make that distinc-
tion. Whether the worker takes the initiative to leave and the separation is
called a quit, or the employer takes the initiative and it is called a layoff,
is a detail of governance, not an allocational issue, in those models. It
remains a possibility that layoffs differ from quits in a meaningful way, but
labor market theory has yet to resolve that question.
Hall observed that vacancies in the most recent recession had been
high relative to the high level of unemployment. The result is what
looks like a shift of the Beveridge curve, but it could also be that the
dynamics matter. Job creation as measured by vacancies has accelerated
recently, but unemployment has not yet declined by the corresponding
amount. When the job finding rate was high, unemployment dynamics
were largely disregarded, but now that the job finding rate has dropped
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to half its normal level, the dynamics matter. Work by Hal Varian using
Google Insight shows a dramatic decline recently in the number of people
using the search term “unemployment insurance,” which is a good sign. It
was possible that vacancies would remain high and that unemployment
would decline relatively rapidly, putting the economy back on the histori-
cal Beveridge curve.
Hall concluded that the present paper strongly supported the idea that
there is no important labor market story for where the recent recession
came from. There has been a very large, but directionally normal, response
in the labor market, and there is little to suggest that a rapid expansion of
demand would not quickly restore full employment.
Responding to Hall, Robert Gordon pointed out that the share of the
total decline in hours that has taken the form of involuntary part-time work
in this recession is unprecedented. Hence, any increase in the rate of output
growth will likely be met disproportionately by firms moving part-time
workers back to full-time work. Because the slack in the economy is thus
concentrated in hours rather than bodies, it will prevent growth in real GDP
from appreciably decreasing the unemployment rate.
Gordon was reminded of his own forthcoming paper on the demise of
Okun’s law, which documented a systematic structural shift. Comparing
data from different periods roughly before and after the mid-1980s, that
paper showed that the labor market has become much more responsive to
changes in the output gap than in Okun’s original formulation, in which
two-thirds of any such change was matched by changes in aggregate hours
and the remaining one-third by changes in productivity. In the last 25 years
the productivity response has all but vanished, so that virtually the entire
response now comes from hours. What might explain this shift is the sense
that workers have become more disposable. A March 18, 2010, article in
the Economist, titled “Slash and Earn,” highlights how the cyclical behav-
ior of the European and the U.S. economies differs on this score. Europe’s
typical response to a recession involves more traditional labor hoarding,
and thus a collapse in productivity but a smaller decline in jobs for a given
change in the output gap. This idea of the disposable American worker
might be related to the increase in inequality and the decreased bargaining
power of workers in the U.S. economy.
Olivier Blanchard suggested that although both quits and layoffs reflect
the realization that it is no longer efficient for a worker and an employer to
stay together, they differ in the source of the shock that leads to separation.
Quits come from a shock to the worker, whereas layoffs occur when some-
thing happens to the profitability of the firm. Blanchard also proposed that
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differences in time spent searching for work might explain the outliers in
the matching function that the authors had observed, or the fact that there
is more unemployment than expected given the current level of vacancies.
In depressed markets, some job losers are still counted as unemployed but
in fact are no longer searching for work. If the necessary data are avail-
able, it might be worth correcting the matching function for this.
Steven Davis regarded the evidence presented by Lawrence Katz on the
long-term consequences of job loss and displacement as strongly indicat-
ing that many workers are in for a difficult time for many years to come.
This is an aspect common to severe cyclical downturns to which macro-
economists have paid too little attention. He noted that when one combines
the JOLTS data on hires and vacancies with the CPS measure of unem-
ployment, looking through the lens of the simplest Cobb-Douglas match-
ing function with an exponent of around 0.4 on the unemployment rate,
things line up beautifully from 2001 to 2007. Hires per vacancy and the
transformed unemployment-to-vacancies ratio follow each other closely,
consistent with a standard Beveridge curve relationship. The two measures
diverged sharply, however, beginning in early 2008; since then there
have been far too few hires per vacancy given the unemployment-to-
vacancies ratio. Looking at the labor market in this way reveals a more
pronounced and earlier departure from the normal pattern, again suggest-
ing that something unusual has happened in the labor market during the
Great Recession.
Justin Wolfers responded to two points in Katz’s comment. The first
was his observation that divorce and job loss are highly correlated.
Although this is true in the cross section—people who lose their jobs are
indeed more likely to get divorced—the behavior of the divorce rate is in
fact completely acyclical. Since the start of the Great Recession, the
divorce rate has continued to fall right up until the most recent data. Katz’s
second point was that over the past year, inflation does not seem to have
been trending either upward or downward. That normally suggests that
unemployment is near its natural rate, and if that is the case, there is much
less reason for optimism about the near-term path of the unemployment
rate. Finally, Wolfers noted that Jeremy Nalewaik’s paper made the case
that the measure of GDP based on income rather than expenditure gives
a much more accurate reading in real time. Since December 2006 the
expenditure-based measure has risen by 33⁄4 points more than the income-
based measure. Thus, by the income-based measure, productivity might
very well be falling, not growing, and unemployment is about where one
would expect from Okun’s law.
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Robert Shimer believed that labor productivity growth would decrease
in the near term, but he was not convinced that it would turn negative. He
was reminded of a comment he had presented on another paper by Elsby,
in which he (Shimer) discussed quits and layoffs as quite distinct things.
Before 1994, the CPS used to ask unemployed workers every month why
they were not working but did not require that the answers be consistent.
In fact, among respondents who were unemployed in two consecutive
months, about 30 percent of those who reported in the first month that they
were job leavers switched the next month and said they had been fired. In
contrast, the switch in the other direction was about 5 percent on average.
Moreover, the switches were countercyclical. One would expect to see 
a boost during a recession, especially a deep recession, in the fraction of
people who report themselves as having lost their job rather than quit. So,
although the distinction between quits and layoffs is meaningful at some
level, there is much spurious measurement of it, and a lot of murky ground
in between the two concepts.
Steven Davis echoed Elsby and Blanchard on the importance of the
quits-versus-layoffs distinction. He granted that the distinction is blurry,
but hardly more so than that between being unemployed and being out
of the labor force, yet that has not led economists to abandon the study
of unemployment. Davis agreed with Hall that economic theory lacks a
satisfactory micro foundation, other than a labeling story, for separations
that are not jointly wealth maximizing. But by the same token, there was
once a time when economics lacked a satisfactory theory of frictional
unemployment, yet that did not prevent its recognition as an important
phenomenon. In some of his own work with Jason Faberman and John
Haltiwanger, Davis had found strong relationships among layoffs, quits,
and hires. In the cross section, they are closely related to job creation
and destruction. In good times many workers quit establishments that are
shrinking moderately, perhaps because they anticipate bad times and lay-
offs coming. Much less of this kind of preemptive quitting occurs in weak
labor markets. A related phenomenon is the well-known and quite pro-
nounced cyclical variation in the ratio of quits to layoffs. This suggests not
only that firms are suffering different kinds of shocks in booms than in
busts, but also that workers perceive that their opportunities elsewhere are
more limited during weak labor markets, leading them to wait until the
ship sinks before abandoning it.
Richard Cooper argued that there is an intrinsic ambiguity, at least in
some parts of the labor market, about the distinction between quits and
layoffs. For example, some separations that are technically quits occur
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under circumstances in which the employer has made it clear that the
worker’s performance was not satisfactory and that the worker’s long-term
prospects at the firm were poor. Gary Burtless pointed out a simple dis-
tinction between quits and layoffs that has real economic significance in
the United States: workers who quit are not entitled to unemployment ben-
efits, whereas workers who are laid off are. This has clear implications for
how individuals prefer to be labeled when they flow into unemployment.
Valerie Ramey noted a dramatic increase, particularly in the West, and
particularly in the construction sector, in the fraction of the labor force
who are recent immigrants. Much anecdotal evidence suggests that when
the recession hit, many of these immigrants returned to their home coun-
tries. This may indicate a more elastic labor supply response among some
of these marginal workers, which could have an impact on the overall sta-
tistics for unemployment and labor force participation.
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